

Coming closer to a solution in Moldova?

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Introduction

The Republic of Moldova has come more and more to the attention of policy makers in Western Europe during the last year. With Romania's accession to the European Union (EU) scheduled for 2007, Moldova will become a direct neighbour of the EU in 2007. In Brussels and elsewhere this outlook has stimulated interest in a country which was once labelled by *The Economist* as a country 'not so much forgotten, than never remembered.' Moldova is today not only the poorest country in Europe, but it currently also offers its citizens few perspectives for a brighter future: The Communist-led government was not able to convince the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the summer of 2003 to resume lending and will now face a hard winter as the European Commission and other donors threaten to freeze their financing, too. Most of all, however, the country suffers under the implications of the unresolved conflict between the central government and the separatist Transdniestrian region.²

Transdniestria de facto seceded from Moldova in 1991. Although not recognised by any other country, Transdniestria has succeeded in establishing and consolidating its de facto statehood after it fought a short but bloody war with the central authorities in the spring of 1992. As a result, the economic ties between Transdniestria and the rest of Moldova have been partly severed. Taxes and transport fees raised by Transdniestrian authorities have made trade with and transfer through Transdniestria more difficult and more expensive for Moldovan entrepreneurs. Moreover, every year Chisinau³ loses several million dollars in revenue from taxes and duties. The reason for this is that Moldova is not able to control the Transdniestrian section of its border with Ukraine and as it has also refrained from establishing effective customs control on its inner boundary with Transdniestria it is unable to assure the collection of taxes and duties on goods imported into Moldova via Transdniestria. To make things worse, Moldova — based on a customs protocol signed in 1996 with Tiraspol⁴ — also does not collect taxes and duties on goods imported directly into Moldova but declared to be in transit to Transdniestria. Whereas certain circles in Tiraspol, Chisinau and elsewhere profit from the contraband in cigarettes, alcohol, fuel and other goods,

¹ The author is Press and Public Affairs Officer of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The views expressed in this article are solely his personal views and do not represent the official position of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. This article takes account of developments before 7 November 2003.

² The Transdniestrian region comprises the area east (or left) of the river Dniestr. The right-bank town of Bender is also controlled by Transdniestrian authorities, whereas some settlements on the left bank around the town of Dubasari are still under Moldovan control.

³ Chisinau is the capital of Moldova.

⁴ Tiraspol is the political and economic centre of the Transdniestrian region.

the population on both sides of the river generally suffer. The GDP per head remains at USD 448 on the right bank and at USD 392 in Transdniestria. More than 600,000 people out of a total population of 4.3 million are estimated to have left the country, a further 10,000 are said to be leaving Moldova every month. Trafficking in human beings, first of all for prostitution and human organs, has risen consistently over the last few years.

Moldova has hardly any opportunity to develop economically, to become a stable and prosperous country, as long as the Transdniestrian conflict remains unresolved. Thus, there is no time to lose. However, finding a sustainable solution which is acceptable to both sides and is supported by the international community is also not easy. Without a greater involvement by the international community, first and foremost by the EU and the United States, both sides might not be able to break the decade-long deadlock in the negotiation process. The fact that the Dutch OSCE Chairmanship has declared Moldova to be one of its priorities during its tenure in 2003 has helped the country to gain more attention in Vienna, The Hague and elsewhere. Moreover, increased interest by the European Union in securing a stable and prosperous neighbourhood for the enlarged Union has heightened the pressure on both sides to work constructively to come to a final settlement agreement. This momentum must at least be maintained in 2004 in order to bring Moldova closer to a solution.

Against this background, this article aims to analyze the successes and the setbacks which Moldova has experienced in the first ten months of 2003 and to provide the reader with an overview of on what has to be done and what has to be achieved in the months and years to come. In this regard, three interlinked aspects require special attention:

1. The negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict:
2. The discussion regarding the future peacekeeping operation in Moldova:
3. The withdrawal of Russian ammunition and military equipment from Transdniestria.

Conflict settlement through federalization?

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)⁵ established a long-term mission in Moldova on 27 April 1993. The Mission was, *inter alia*, mandated to 'facilitate the establishment of a comprehensive political framework for dialogue and negotiations and assist the parties to the [Transdniestrian] conflict in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement of the conflict, consolidating the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova along with an understanding about a special status for the Trans-Dniester region'.⁶ Based on this mandate, the OSCE Mission has supported the negotiation process through its good offices, facilitation and mediation during the last

⁵ The abbreviation OSCE will be used even when referring to the period before 1995 when it was still the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), citations being the only exception.

⁶ CSO Vienna Group, *Journal No. 7*, Annex 1, 11 March 1993.

decade. Already in November 1993 it drafted a report which contained the basic principles of a special status for the Transdniestrian region of Moldova. Together with Russia and Ukraine, the OSCE Mission has thereafter drafted a series of other documents which have been used as a basis for the negotiations on a final status for Transdniestria and has mediated between the two sides in conflict situations concerning practical questions related to economic and educational issues.

In Kiev in July 2002 the mediators presented to the parties a new draft for a final document. The Kiev document set out the main principles of the system of governance for a unified Republic of Moldova as well as a system of guarantees and transitional procedures.⁷ Most importantly, article 1 of the Kiev document described the Republic of Moldova as a democratic, federal State, governed by the rule of law, with a republican form of government. By accepting the Kiev document as a basis for further negotiations the Moldovan side had agreed, for the first time, to the idea of a federal solution to the conflict. In his constitutional initiative from February 2003, Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin, went even further and proposed to 'Transdniestria to become a participant and co-author of the new Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. The fundamental principles of constitutional structure, as well as the mechanism of their implementation and entering into effect are to constitute the basis of the new draft agreement with Transdniestria'.⁸

Voronin's initiative enclosed a detailed road-map aimed at reintegrating the country by February 2005. According to this road-map, the text of the new constitution shall be drafted within six months by a Joint Constitutional Commission (JCC), comprised of Moldovan and Transdniestrian experts supported by observers from Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, as well as the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. In the end, observers from the European Union were also invited. The draft constitution shall be publicly discussed for two months and shall be subject to a referendum, organized not later than 1 February 2004. Elections to a new parliament of the united Republic of Moldova shall take place no later than 25 February 2005.⁹ Parallel to the work of the Joint Constitutional Commission, negotiations in the established five-sided format (Moldova, Transdniestria, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE) were to continue.¹⁰ In fact, the five-sided political negotiations still remain the most important forum for the settlement process as all politically sensitive issues related to the development of the new constitution are discussed first and foremost in this forum.

⁷ For an English language translation of the document see Bruno Coppeters/Michael Emerson, Conflict Resolution for Moldova and Transdniestria through Federalisation? CEPS Policy Brief No. 25 August 2002.

⁸ Osce, SEC.DEL/31/0, 20 February 2003, Statement by the President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Osce, PC.FR/5/03, 17 February 2003, Report to the OSCE Permanent Council, Ambassador William Hill, Head of osce Mission to Moldova, February 18, 2003.

Voronin's initiative to invite the Transdniestrian authorities to draw up a new constitution for an unified Moldovan state within the framework of a Joint Constitutional Commission, for the first time opened the possibility to develop a common constitution instead of amending the Moldovan constitution from 1994. The latter had been elaborated and adopted by a parliament elected in February 1994. As Transdniestria did not take part in the 1994 parliamentary elections¹¹ the 1994 constitution is basically a right-bank document. The reaction from Tiraspol was nevertheless not euphoric. While the new initiative was welcomed and supported by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, the Transdniestrian side again insisted on the establishment of equal relations between Moldova and Transdniestria on a contractual basis.¹² This basic line has not changed in the course of the negotiations. On the occasion of the 13th anniversary of the 'Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic', the Transdniestrian leader, Igor Smirnov, has again spoken out in favour of 'a contractual federation consisting of two equal-right states'.¹³ Thus, although the Transdniestrian side has agreed to the notion of a 'federation' it still de facto envisages rather a confederation similar to the one in Serbia-Montenegro — a model which is not acceptable to the Moldovan side. Chisinau upholds the position that a federation has to be an asymmetrical one, in which more rights would be granted to the right bank than to Transdniestria. Chisinau also rejects the idea that both subjects should be equally represented on the federal level. A solution close to the Serbia-Montenegro model, however, could also hardly be endorsed by the OSCE with regard to Moldova. The OSCE has repeatedly reaffirmed that its work in Moldova is aimed at consolidating the independence and sovereignty of the Moldovan state. Accordingly, as already has been mentioned by the Mission in its Report No. 13 from November 1993, the 'division of Moldova into two or more separate states either coexisting side by side or within a 'confederation' has to be ruled out.'¹⁴

Despite this principal disagreement, the negotiation process has continued in 2003, albeit more in terms of procedure than content. On 19 March, a protocol on the establishment of a Joint Constitutional Commission (JCC)¹⁵ was signed and on 4 April and 9 April 2003 the Moldovan and Transdniestrian parliaments appointed their members to the Joint Constitutional Commission. On 24 April the inaugural meeting of the JCC took place at the premises of the OSCE Mission and on the

¹¹ Like in subsequent national elections, special voting sections were assigned for potential voters from Transdniestria on Moldovan-controlled territory. However, less than two per cent of the eligible voters from Transdniestria made use of this opportunity in 1994.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Infotag 1 September 2003, Transnistrian Leader for Contractual Federation of Two Equal/Right States.

¹⁴ Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova 13 November 1993, http://www.osce.org/documents/mm/1993/11/454_en.pdf.

¹⁵ The abbreviation JCC is also used for the Joint Control Commission, which was established in 1992 as the highest decision-making body for the trilateral Russian-Transdniestrian-Moldovan peacekeeping operation in Moldova.

sidelines of a seminar on federalism, organized by the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE on 12 and 13 May 2003 in Chisinau and Tiraspol. Members of the Moldovan and the Transdnistrian delegation met separately with experts from the EU and the Council of Europe. However, no substantive work was done by the JCC until mid-July. Only after intense mediation by the OSCE were the parties able to agree on 3 July on the place to convene and on the rules regulating the work of the Commission. JCC meetings are now held every Tuesday in premises provided by the OSCE in Bender.

By early October, no breakthrough has been achieved in the JCC as both sides stick to their old lines. On 5 August, for example, the Transdnistrian JCC delegation tabled a draft constitution,¹⁶ which departed considerably from the basic lines of the Kiev document. The Transdnistrian draft included, *inter alia*, the possibility to leave the federation after a respective referendum and established a strict equal representation of both sides on the federal level. In contrast to this, the Kiev document foresees equal representation of the subjects of a federation only in the upper chamber of parliament. As a veto of the upper chamber could have been overruled by the lower chamber, which was to be formed on a proportional basis, Transdnistria — according to the Kiev model — would not have been able to block legislation on the federal level without support from the right bank.

Progress in the JCC was only made in August and September 2003 with regard to the chapter on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The two sides were able to agree on 23 September on most of the articles of this chapter. However, no agreement has been reached on the wording on the most contentious issues in this section, such as education, citizenship and the structure of the health system. Up until early November, also no progress has been made with regard to the chapter on state structures. All these controversial articles will most probably have to be discussed in the political five-sided negotiations where all matters which cannot be resolved within the framework of the JCC are ultimately discussed.

Thus six months after the inaugural meeting of the JCC, no real progress in developing a new constitution has been made and the prospect of reaching a breakthrough within the near future are also not bright. On the right bank, the idea of a federal state is continuously criticized by the opposition forces and large parts of the civil society. In the summer of 2003 the Moldovan government itself refrained from direct countering this criticism and it gave observers the impression that it does not stand united behind the model of a federal solution. What is still absent in Moldova more than a year after the idea of a federal solution was put to a public debate is a constructive discussion on the essence of federalism and the nature of the compromises which Moldovan society would be ready to make in the spheres of power-sharing and the division of competences in order to reach a settlement. By denouncing 'federalization' as a mechanism for transforming Moldova into a Russian protectorate, the opponents of this idea

¹⁶ See <http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol29-08-03.htm>.

deliberately play with the fears of the Romanian-speaking majority which for decades have suffered under Russian and Soviet domination. That Moldova is weak, unstable and vulnerable because it has not managed to reintegrate, that autonomy solutions which have been discussed in previous years might grant more rights to an entity than federal models and that federalism fosters integration instead of separation and that it enshrines the principle of power-sharing which is one of the main ingredients of a democratic state is lost to the radical opponents of federalism. What Moldova would need in order to come closer to a solution would be a constructive and open debate not directed against federalization but directed towards how a fair settlement agreement should look like. Transdnistria, which has enjoyed *de facto* independence for a decade, will not be reintegrated into Moldova unless Chisinau is ready to offer a fair settlement agreement including a clear division of competences and a reasonable degree of power-sharing.

In fact, the opposition Christian Democratic Peoples Party, supported by the newspaper Flux and other pro-Romanian forces, seem to favour a civilized divorce over a reintegration of the country.¹⁷ In this, they share a common goal with the current Transdnistrian leadership which, so far, has not demonstrated any political will to come to a final settlement agreement. Such political will might only evaporate as a result of international pressure. Already on 27 February 2003, the Council of the European Union imposed a travel ban on 17 Transdnistrian leaders 'considered to be primarily responsible for the lack of cooperation to promote a political settlement of the conflict'.¹⁸ The EU found the 'continued obstructionism' of the Transdnistrian leadership in the status negotiations to be unacceptable and threatened that it might consider additional targeted restrictive measures at a later date.¹⁹ Although not mentioned in the decision itself, it is widely understood that the freezing of assets might be one of the next steps for the EU to consider. Although the travel ban has induced the Transdnistrian side to be at least temporarily more co-operative with regard to the removal of Russian troops (see below), it has so far failed to overcome the obstructive stance of Tiraspol in the negotiation process. Further measures might, thus, indeed be needed.

Such measures have to be aimed, first and foremost, at reducing the benefits which the Transdnistrian leaderships enjoys under the current state of affairs. Next to financial and economic sanctions, the establishment of a functioning unified customs system along Moldova's entire border would be directed towards this end. The EU could contribute to the latter through technical assistance and by urging Ukraine and Moldova to come to an agreement on joint customs posts along their entire border. At the same time, the EU could provide additional

¹⁷ See the commentary by Petru Bogatu in Flux 5 September 2003

¹⁸ European Council, Council Common Position 2003/139/CFSP of 27 February 2003 concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Moldovan Republic.

¹⁹ Ibid.

incentives for Moldovans and Transdnistrians by providing funds for a post-conflict rehabilitation programme to be implemented after a final settlement has been agreed upon. A stronger engagement by the EU in the conflict settlement process is therefore needed. In mid-September President Voronin even requested the EU's participation in the negotiation process. However, this invitation might not be followed up by Brussels, which might come to the conclusion that it might play an even stronger role by supporting the efforts of the OSCE bi- and multilaterally outside the official negotiation format.

Peacekeeping in Moldova — A role for the European Union?

An area where the EU might wish to engage itself more concretely is a future peacekeeping operation in Moldova. Since the Kiev document introduced the idea of a peacekeeping operation under the aegis of the OSCE, the nature of such a force has been increasingly intensively discussed in Vienna, Brussels and Chisinau. The Dutch Chairmanship-in-Office suggested in the summer of 2003 that the core of such a force might come from the EU. Preliminary discussions on that topic have been held within the framework of the Political and Security Committee of the EU on 5 September 2003, but by October 2003 no decision has been taken in this regard. The idea of an EU Peace Consolidation Force under OSCE mandate was as a matter of fact just one of the models discussed among diplomats during the summer and autumn of 2003 and no general agreement has been found with regard to the exact terms of such an operation.

Such a force, which most probably would also comprise Russian troops, would replace the current trilateral Russian-Moldovan-Transdnistrian peacekeeping force, which has been stationed in the region since 1992. It would have to be multinational and should be deployed for only a limited period. It should also be limited in numbers and might therefore be considerably smaller than the current 1,500 strong trilateral force. Its main aim would be to act as a buffer force between the Moldovan and Transdnistrian forces and to prevent potential spoilers from destabilizing the situation. As the reduction of the Moldovan and Transdnistrian forces, probably even a total demilitarization of the region, would be the ultimate goal, the new operation should also comprise military observers and should have an in-built dynamic aimed at reducing the peacekeeping component while increasing the observation and verification component. Finally, an overall reform of the security forces of both sides should be carried out by or with the support of the new peace consolidation force.

As of early November 2003 no consensus on the replacement of the current trilateral operation by a new multinational peace consolidation force has been reached — neither among the OSCE participating States nor among the parties to the conflict. Russian diplomats have continuously referred to the success of the current peacekeeping operation during the summer of 2003 and have labelled the discussion on their replacement as premature as long as a political settlement has not been reached. In any case, Russia has expressed its desire to be in charge of any peacekeeping operation in Moldova. Tiraspol, on its side, has backed a

Russian initiative on organizing such an operation under the Russian Federation's aegis.²⁰ Thus, the negotiations on this issue have to continue for the time being in Chisinau, Tiraspol, Moscow, Vienna and Brussels.

Meeting the Porto deadline

In this respect, it has to be understood that the mandate and the nature of the future peacekeeping operation in Moldova is not only connected to the political conflict settlement process but also to the status of the Russian troops in Moldova. Back in 1992, the CSCE Ministerial in Stockholm called on Russia and Moldova to conclude a bilateral agreement on the status of the Russian troops still stationed in the Transdnestrian region and on their early, orderly and complete withdrawal.²¹ Such an agreement was finally signed on 21 October 1994, but the Russian Duma's refusal to ratify the document meant that it never came into force. Nevertheless, Russia had committed itself within the framework of the OSCE to a timely, orderly and complete withdrawal of its troops. Indeed the number of Russian troops was reduced from 9,250 in 1992 to 2,600 in 1999.²² At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, Russia committed itself to withdrawing or destroying all CFE-Treaty-Limited-Equipment by the end of 2001, and to completing the withdrawal of its troops by the end of 2002. While Russia met the first deadline even ahead of time, it missed the second one. Although Tiraspol had agreed to allow the withdrawal and destruction of the remaining military equipment and of the approximately 40,000 tons of ammunition stockpiled in a military depot in Kolbasna in northern Transdnestria, it had blocked any attempts to withdraw or destroy the ammunition and the military equipment not covered by the CFE Treaty after December 2001. Up until March 2003, the Transdnestrian authorities used various administrative means and impediments to prevent or at least to slow down the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment, including through ostensibly independent groups such as Cossacks and the 'Women of Transdnestria'.²³ As a result, the withdrawal process was not completed in time and the OSCE participating States decided at the Porto Ministerial to extend the Istanbul deadline to the end of 2003.

Although the presence of Russian troops has become far less significant in military terms since 1992, it is still seen as reassuring for the Transdnestrian side. Moreover, Transdnestria now claims that it inherited the Russian military equipment from the former Soviet Union and has therefore demanded financial compensation for its removal. Such compensation was already offered by Russia

²⁰ Infotag 1 September 2003, ... and for Military Guaranteed Operation under Russia's Aegis.

²¹ Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Third Meeting of the Council, Stockholm, 14-15 December 1992, Summary of Conclusions, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/3stoc92e.htm> (20 June 2003).

²² William Hill, 'Making Istanbul a reality: Moldova, Russia, and withdrawal from Transdnestria', *Helsinki Monitor*, Vol. 13 (2002), p. 135.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 136f.

in September 2002 in the form of a US\$ 100 million write-off for outstanding gas debts. However, only on 4 March 2003 was an agreement reached between the Transdniestrian leadership and Gazprom on this debt write-off in return for the withdrawal of Russian military equipment and ammunition. Only a couple of days earlier the EU had imposed the above mentioned travel ban on the Transdniestrian leadership. The possibility that more sanctions and, most of all, financial sanctions might be imposed, had certainly alerted the Transdniestrian leadership. This, as well as signals from the Russian side that the threat of sanctions might be helpful in supporting the fulfilment of the Istanbul obligations²⁴, contributed to the decisive decree adopted by the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet on 5 March 2003. In this decree it was recommended to the Transdniestrian leadership that it should ensure and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military equipment and ammunition. It was understood that with this decision all political obstacles to the withdrawal had been resolved and that complete withdrawal could start.

As a result the withdrawal of ammunition and military equipment from Transdniestria proceeded between March and June 2003 with unprecedented speed. Around 35 per cent of the ammunition and equipment were withdrawn from Transdniestria in the following three months. But in mid-June the process again stalled. The Transdniestrian authorities blocked the further departure of a train already loaded with ammunition for a whole month and although this train was finally released no further trains were even loaded during the summer. Only on 26 October and 5 November 2003 two more trains carrying ammunition left the region, but whether this is really a sign for new dynamic in the withdrawal process remains to be seen.

Moreover, the Transdniestrian side, in breach of an already signed agreement, continued to refuse the entry of a special kiln from the German company Luthe, designed for the on-site destruction of ammunition. The Transdniestrian side argued that it has not received the promised gas debt write-off and insisted that it would not allow the removal process to continue until this issue was solved. But this might not be the only reason for the renewed Transdniestrian resistance to withdrawal. Already in May, the possibility of delays in the withdrawal process was discussed in Chisinau if ammunition has to be withdrawn which is too old to be of use to the modernized Russian military, but still of interest to Transdniestria — either for its own forces or for export.

The remaining 26,000 tons of ammunition could have been withdrawn from Transdniestria in time if the withdrawal process would have been restarted in early October 2003 and if it would have proceeded without delay. But as the withdrawal process has remained stagnant beyond that date, the OSCE participating states now face, at the Ministerial Council in Maastricht, the difficult task of deciding on an eventual second prolongation of the Istanbul

²⁴ It has to be noted here that Russia was opposed to sanctions in connection with the political negotiations process.

deadline. In this respect, two aspects are important to keep in mind. First, the Istanbul commitments will remain in place regardless of whether or not a clear date is set and secondly, even if the withdrawal of the ammunition and the equipment will be completed, the Istanbul and Porto commitments would not have been fulfilled unless the remaining 1,300 Russian troops stationed in the region would also have been withdrawn or would have retained another status. As no movement is in sight with regard to this issue one has to concede that like the question of political negotiations and the question of a new peacekeeping operation, promising developments have been considerably slowed down also with regard to the withdrawal questions. Thus, the opportunities to bring Moldova closer to a solution in 2003 threaten away of hand once more.

Conclusion

Due to the heightened interest in Moldova and because of the resulting international pressure, serious positive developments have taken place in Moldova in 2003. Although not yet complete, the withdrawal of Russian military equipment and ammunition has made great headways in the first part of the year and the potential of Russia to fulfil its commitments has been proved. Moreover, the EU has become more and more engaged and has for the first time seriously discussed the possibility of committing itself in the form of peacekeepers in Moldova. Although a final decision on the future of the peacekeeping operation has not been taken and although several options remain under discussion, it can be said that the initiative of the Dutch OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office has initiated a new, concrete and creative discussion on this issue. The options discussed in 2003 are a good basis for action in 2004. Finally, the political settlement process has also profited from the heightened interest of the US, the EU and single Western States. The negotiations based on the Kiev document and President Voronin's initiative could lead to a breakthrough in 2004 provided the international pressure on the parties is maintained and even increased. An even greater engagement on the part of the US and the EU in support of the mediation efforts of the OSCE is needed in this respect. Moldova cannot afford to lose more time and the EU cannot afford to let Moldova slip down further. While pressing for a speedy political settlement of the Transdnestrrian conflict is important, the international community must also understand that such a settlement has also to be acceptable to all sides, it has to be in line with the OSCE principles and other international standards with regard to human rights, rule of law and democracy, it has to be sustainable in order to stabilize the country and it has to be supported by the international community as the real work in terms of reunification, reintegration and rebuilding has to be done after the conclusion of such an agreement.²⁵ Thus, there is much work to be done in order to bring Moldova

²⁵ For these points see Neil Brennan, OSCE Dynamics in the 'frozen conflict' in Moldova, presentation to the seminar 'Frozen conflicts in Europe — the approach of democratic security: the case of Transdnestrria' hosted by the Council of Europe on 11 and 12 September 2003 in Chisinau.

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