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Europe After NATO Expansion: The Unfinished Security Agenda

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Europe After NATO Expansion: The Unfinished Security Agenda

Abstract

The debate on European security over the past several years has focused almost exclusively on the question of whether, and to which countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should expand its membership. With the near certainty of NATO Parliaments ratifying the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, two important policy issues now loom: how enlargement will affect NATO's contribution to European security, and whether further enlargement is a preferable course of action to other alternatives for enhancing security in Europe.

This assessment concludes that NATO's central challenges will remain internal. The NATO allies have still not developed a workable consensus on the breadth, either geographically or functionally, of NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe. As discussions over the cost of enlargement and the crisis in Iraq have demonstrated, the burdensharing issue remains a source of resentment on both sides of the Atlantic. The "revolution in military affairs" occurring in U.S. military forces and continued attention to the European Union's economic and monetary union will exacerbate the burdensharing issue. Many of NATO's internal difficulties are inherent in the transition after the Cold War; however, they nonetheless deserve more attention than they currently receive. NATO has succeeded in creating a NATO-centric European security system, and must resolve these disputes for Europe to be secure.

Incorporation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO does not change NATO's central purposes, nor does it, on balance, change the alliance's ability to effectively carry out its responsibilities. Although their inclusion will certainly make the accession states feel more secure, and Russia perhaps less so, the net effect of NATO's first tranche of expansion will not appreciably change the European security landscape. NATO's further enlargement in the near term does pose higher risks of greater insecurity, most notably in relations with Russia.

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by Kori Schake

The debate on European security over the past several years has focused almost exclusively on the question of whether, and to which countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should expand its membership. With the near certainty of NATO Parliaments ratifying the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, two important policy issues now loom: how enlargement will affect NATO's contribution to European security, and whether further enlargement is a preferable course of action to other alternatives for enhancing security in Europe.

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Incorporation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO does not change NATO's central purposes, nor does it, on balance, change the alliance's ability to effectively carry out its responsibilities. Although their inclusion will certainly make the accession states feel more secure, and Russia perhaps less so, the net effect of NATO's first tranche of expansion will not appreciably change the European security landscape. NATO's further enlargement in the near term does pose higher risks of greater insecurity, most notably in relations with Russia.

While the alliance makes important contributions to European security, NATO is a necessary but insufficient condition for a secure Europe. By reason of NATO's membership and mandate, it cannot make Europe secure simply by expanding. NATO can best increase security beyond its borders by building a stronger transatlantic relationship, continuing practices that diminish the distinction between NATO members and non-members, and working in closer coordination with other organizations, especially the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Instead of focusing on a second tranche of NATO enlargement, the U.S. should invest more political effort in other institutions and processes that *complement* NATO's activities and further security in Europe. An agenda of action should include:

- building greater consensus within NATO on the range of its activities and area of operation, to include an agreement on how allies will share that burden;
- using the Partnership for Peace (PEP) more fully to reduce the distinction between NATO members and non-members;
- vesting more political importance in the OSCE and strengthening its ability to act;
- accepting an explicit OSCE mandate for NATO or PfP coalition operations outside the NATO area;
- building institutional linkages between NATO and the OSCE to create a continuum-of-response capability, from early warning to military enforcement;
- merging into the OSCE parallel fora and practices, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; and
- invigorating regional arms control and confidence building initiatives by the OSCE to reduce the levels of weaponry and increase transparency and understanding in potentially unstable regions.

The First Tranche

The U.S. Senate will vote this spring on whether to ratify the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, and will almost certainly consent to ratification. Both the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee support, and the Senate Majority Leader envisions no difficulty with, ratification.¹ The Clinton Administration has persuaded the Senate that the Administration takes seriously the potential for damaging U.S. security interests by alienating Russia, and is successfully managing the relationship bilaterally. Even many opponents of expansion believe U.S. interests would be damaged by refusing admission to the accession states now.

Hearings in both the authorization and appropriations committees raised concerns about the share of costs to be borne by America's current NATO allies, and the potential effects on American forces if funds beyond those appropriated for expansion costs are shifted within the defense

1 Letter from Senators Jesse Helms and Joseph Biden to the President, 10 November 1997. For Senator Trent Lott's evaluation that the Senate would vote in favor, see "Senate May OK Adding 3 Nations to NATO," *San Diego Union Tribune*, 19 January 1998.

budget, but most Senators appear unwilling to punish Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for disagreements with France, Germany, and Belgium.² Senior officials from the three accession states will be meeting with members of Congress—and traveling to states of key Senators to build support—prior to the vote. Once the ratification process is concluded in the U.S., other NATO states are unlikely to oppose accession.³ In all likelihood, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will become NATO members in the spring of 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary.

Since accession of the three new members seems assured, the relevant policy questions are: (1) how expansion will affect NATO; and (2) what else will be required to provide durable security.

How Expansion Will Affect NATO

Lord Ismay's hackneyed witticism that NATO's central purposes were "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down" understates the real challenges of the alliance. Fundamentally, the Alliance is about process as much as outcome.⁴ Its central purposes are: managing military threats, maintaining defense capabilities adequate to deter and defend against threats, organizing multinational military operations, maintaining political cohesion, and keeping America involved in European security. None of these areas will be affected in a major way by the incorporation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.

Managing Military Threats

The combination of Russia's imperial history, potential military forces capability, and uncertain path towards democracy have sustained concern about a Russian threat even after the Cold War.⁵ A

2 "The Price of Expansion," *The Economist*, 15 November 1997, p. 53; "A Big String Added to NATO Growth," *International Herald Tribune*, December 24/25, p. 6.

3 In fact, there has been very little public debate over expansion in most member countries, suggesting that there will be little opposition.

4 Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), p. 8–11.

5 The preponderance of opinion opposed to NATO expansion is based on concern about the potential Russian threat. See: Charles Kupchan, "Clinton's Next Steps on NATO," *The Washington Post Weekly Edition*, (Vol. 14, No. 44, 8 September

substantial and understandable portion of this concern, especially on the part of states formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, is concern about a repetition of the past. A recidivist Russia holds the same claims on adversaries' attention as a recidivist Germany did in 1945.

However, the actual ability of Russia to pose a military threat to other countries is now very limited. The Russian military's performance in Chechnya illustrated how much operating capability the mighty Russian forces have lost. While urban warfare is difficult and bloody for any army, the lack of training and inter-service coordination among the Russian forces was shocking. Most of the Russian military is conscripted, which translates into less training and motivation than volunteer forces. Russian forces are poorly paid, when they are paid, and are genuinely suffering from neglect.⁶ Commanders are having a difficult time feeding and providing for their troops, which makes unit training a lesser priority.⁷ Reform of the armed forces is urgently needed, but unaffordable under current law, which requires generous provisions to soldiers leaving the service. NATO intelligence assessments consider that it would take the Russian military a full decade to pose a threat to the West.⁸

Russian strategists have attempted to compensate for the weakness of their conventional forces by placing greater emphasis on the role of Russian nuclear forces, much as NATO did during the Cold War, when it considered the Soviet conventional threat unmanageable by Western conventional means.⁹ NATO's experience with this approach indicates that a strategy dependent on early nuclear

weapons use augurs better in defensive than offensive terms; that is, the strategy is more successful in deterring attack than in projecting interests. A heavily nuclear strategy tends to deter conflict with other nuclear powers, but is also less effective in asymmetric conflicts. This suggests that increasing Russian reliance on nuclear forces makes little difference for NATO unless we actually go to war with Russia.

The most capable branches of Russia's armed forces are part of the Ministry of the Interior. Interior Minister Kulikov has successfully argued for priority funding on the basis that there are no real external threats to Russia, whereas preventing the criminalization of Russia is an urgent security task.¹⁰ This indicates that Russian security establishment does not perceive the need for reconstituting its military forces to project power outside Russia, even with the prospect of NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Russians both in the Yeltsin government and outside it have suggested that the position may not hold if NATO expands to incorporate former Soviet states.¹¹ While Russia has recently seemed more flexible on the Baltic issue, this approach is probably part of a broader strategy to reduce the likelihood of Baltic accession.¹² The Yeltsin government appears to realize that the more it attempts to intimidate the Baltic states or publicly opposes their accession, the more Russia legitimates the Baltic argument for admission to NATO. Instead, the Yeltsin government is combining privately expressed clear opposition to any NATO expansion into the former Soviet Union with public proposals to ameliorate Baltic insecurity.¹³ It would be a mistake to read a more cooperative Russian attitude on the Baltic states as diminished Russian concern about NATO crossing the line into the former Soviet Union.

Russia certainly cannot prevent NATO's enlargement into Central Europe, or even the former Soviet Union. However, the cost to NATO of

1997); Amos Perlmutter and Ted Carpenter, "NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement," *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 1998); Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO-Russian Relations," *Survival* Vol. 39, 1 (Spring 1997); Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," *Survival* Vol. 38, 1 (Spring 1996). Michael Mandelbaum's comments in Council on Foreign Relations "Expanding NATO: Will It Weaken the Alliance?" *Great Debates Series*, 9 December 1996. Elsewhere Mandelbaum has argued against expansion as a burdensharing issue—that is, the EU should have expanded to include Central Europe, and their failure should not be rewarded by the U.S. in expanding NATO. See: Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1997).

6 "Yeltsin Moves for Reductions in Armed Forces," *USA Today*, 26 November 1997, p. 17.

7 A recent study by the Congressional Research Service concludes that "the 'Russian military threat' is now more to Russia than from Russia." Study cited in "Russian Military Held in Disrepair," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 3 December 1997, p. 4.

8 General Mackenzie, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, personal interview 28 October 1997.

9 "Russia Considering Increased Nuclear Dependence," *The Washington Post*, 7 December 1997, p. 1.

10 Colonel T.R. Milton, U.S. Army Attaché in Moscow, personal interview, 1 December 1997.

11 Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, quoted in "Concerned About U.S., Primakov Urges Restraint," *Washington Times*, 31 December 1997, p. 12; Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace?" *Foreign Policy* No. 99, Summer 1995, p. 3-14; Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO-Russian Relations," *Survival* Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997).

12 For examples of this new Russian attitude see "Force Cuts Pledged by Yeltsin," *The Washington Post* 4 December 1997, p. 1; and Russian reaction to the U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership, "U.S. to Back Baltic Membership in NATO, but Not Anytime Soon," *New York Times* 12 January 1998, p. 1.

13 Dmitri Trenin, personal interview, 5 December 1997.

expansion would not be limited to the near-term Russian response. The United States has a broad agenda of security interests outside of Europe that Russia retains the ability to affect. Russia could cease cooperation on arms control, which affects U.S. security directly.¹⁴ Russia could continue to proliferate sensitive ballistic and nuclear technologies to regimes hostile to U.S. interests, either by government policy or simple inaction.

Certainly the direction of Russian security policy will be affected much more by domestic politics than any Western actions. However, that does not dismiss the concern that by choosing to marginalize Russia when it is weak, the West weakens the case of those Russian politicians who support a cooperative relationship with us, and could assist the political prospects of politicians who see greater value in opposing our interests.¹⁵ With respect to Russian domestic politics, crossing the line into the former Soviet Union would have much greater resonance than admitting any other category of NATO members.

Maintaining Adequate Defense Capabilities

The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept expanded NATO's missions beyond defense of the NATO area to include projecting stability beyond it. In 1992, NATO added peacekeeping. NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan, believes that "NATO is on the razor's edge of having the military capabilities to carry out the missions in the strategic concept."¹⁶ Military implementation of the 1991 Alliance strategic concept reduced by 35 per cent the overall size of NATO forces and radically reduced the readiness requirements associated with most forces. For example, NATO's cold war requirement of generating ten divisions in ten days has been relaxed to ten divisions in 48 weeks.¹⁷ These changes were contingent on developing a power projection force capable of deploying throughout and beyond the NATO area to respond rapidly to emerging crises. The immediate problem for maintaining adequate defense capabilities is that most of America's NATO allies have not made the invest-

ments necessary to create the power projection forces required by the 1991 strategy.¹⁸

The United States budgets about \$100 billion per year more on defense than all other NATO allies combined, even though it has a million fewer troops under arms.¹⁹ That \$100 billion per year is invested in three areas: a highly-trained volunteer force, power projection capabilities, and high-tech weapons equipment. All three are important in maintaining adequate defense capabilities.

Volunteer forces are expensive because they must be recruited away from competing private sector employment. However, because they choose military service, they are more motivated, and have fewer restrictions on where and when they can be deployed than do conscripts. They also stay in the service longer, which means that their skill levels are higher—a particularly important attribute as military tasks become more technologically challenging—and their training can be more sophisticated.

The vast majority of NATO armies do not have the ability to project power outside their own territories, because they were designed to defend their homelands.²⁰ The American military has, for the past 100 years, been largely an expeditionary force expected to operate thousands of miles away from the support offered by domestic infrastructure and goodwill. U.S. forces have the aircraft and fast ships to transport forces, the logistics planning and operations to keep troops supported, and the deployable communications to keep them linked together and with supporting intelligence and other capabilities. Among our NATO allies, only Britain and France could deploy a division-sized force outside their own countries. Unless major upgrades are made in NATO forces, the United States will have predominant responsibility for projecting force for the foreseeable future.²¹

A final area that affects NATO's ability to project power is the yawning gap between the technological capability of American and other NATO

14 "START II Approval Imperiled, Russian Says," *The Washington Post*, 7 December 1997, p. 34.

15 Thomas L. Friedman, "Backlash," *New York Times*, 24 November 1997.

16 General George Joulwan, USA (ret.), former SACEUR, personal interview, 19 January 1998.

17 General Mackenzie, Deputy SACEUR, personal interview, 28 October 1997.

18 Field Marshal Lord Vincent, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, personal interview, 4 August 1997.

19 Based on defense budget figures in *The Military Balance 1996-1997* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996). Using budgeted figures rather than spending makes it possible to exclude the cost of ongoing operations, like Haiti and Bosnia, and focus on what nations believe they need for their force.

20 For an excellent assessment of European force capabilities, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role Of European Forces," *Survival* (Vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997), p. 9-10.

21 Charles Grant, "Strength in Numbers: Europe's Foreign and Defence Policy," (London: Centre for European Reform, 1996) p. 27.

NATO forces.²² While such a gap has probably always existed, it is reaching damaging proportions because U.S. forces are currently incorporating a new generation of emerging information and communications technologies that are changing American military doctrine in revolutionary ways. NATO will soon face the prospect of American forces fighting a much different kind of war than the rest of the allies, with very different concepts of time and space for battle.

None of the three accession states can be said to meet NATO's criteria as "net contributors to NATO's security."²³ NATO military authorities have determined that much of these countries' infrastructure is obsolete, and in any event is clustered in the westernmost regions of the former Warsaw Pact countries. The combat readiness and training levels in forces of all three nations are substantially below NATO standards. Bases (with the exception of those built in Hungary to support deployment of forces into the former Yugoslavia) lack the cargo handling equipment; ground support infrastructure (essential to rapid insertion of forces); or command, control, communication, and navigation equipment to exchange data with NATO.²⁴

Poland has the strongest defense establishment of the three accession countries, and even its Army has "widespread and significant interoperability deficiencies."²⁵ Forces in the Czech Republic also face widespread and significant deficiencies, and the Republic has no current plan to upgrade its infrastructure to NATO standards, despite repeated U.S. complaints about the state of Czech defenses.²⁶ Hungary made a good showing in support of NATO operations in Bosnia, which diminished concern about the low level of defense spending by the Hungarian government. But NATO defense analysts also believe incorporating Hungarian forces into NATO's command and control system will be "very difficult or impossible in the near term." In all three countries, for the foreseeable future, only designated units like those currently employed in NATO's Implementation Force will likely be brought up to NATO standards; the bulk of their forces will remain less adequate.

NATO's official assessment of the cost of expansion as only \$1.5 billion over ten years reflects solely upgrading basic infrastructure and gaining interoperability with the new member states. Upgrading their forces, the largest associated accession expense, is to be paid for by the new members themselves.²⁷ In both Hungary and the Czech Republic, significant opposition exists to NATO membership, because the publics feel no impending threat and do not want to accept the financial obligation of building defense capabilities.²⁸

In order to diminish Russian concerns about expansion, NATO has made the political decision not to deploy forces of other NATO nations on the territory of new members, even though the new members will add roughly fifteen percent more territory to the NATO area. However, NATO forces will almost certainly conduct training in the new countries to assess the alliance's ability to defend the expanded area. Further, NATO force goals and defense planning *will* incorporate the forces and territory of the new members, thus increasing their awareness of the both challenges and contributions of NATO members.

That NATO members will meet their current force goals for power projection is assumed, and therefore not included as a cost of expansion.²⁹ And if NATO *had* fully implemented internal adaptations, necessary to increase its power projection capabilities, defending the new member states would be relatively easy (since the corresponding threat to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is so low). But the shortfalls in power projection capability among other NATO forces mean that American forces will be disproportionately responsible for defending the territory of the new members, should that need arise.

The accession of Hungary poses some additional problems for NATO defense capabilities, because the country is not geographically contiguous with any NATO country. Forces could not be moved into Hungary without the agreement of an adjoining country whose territory or airspace

22 "U.S., Europe Face NATO Burden-Sharing Debate," *The Washington Post*, 16 December 1997, p. A22.

23 NATO "Study on Enlargement," June 1995.

24 "NATO Papers Belie Modest Expansion Cost: Classified Reports Reveal Deep Deficiencies in Polish, Hungarian, Czech Republic Militaries," *Defense News* December 8-14, p. 1.

25 "Defense Review Committee Assessment of Plans of Poland," 25 November 1997, cited *ibid*.

26 "Once-Mighty Soviet Bloc Forces Fade," *Washington Times*, 17 November 1997, p. 13.

27 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "NATO Beyond Enlargement," speech to the UK Atlantic Council, London, 19 November 1997; distributed electronically by NATO.

28 Support in Hungary hovers around 60 percent, the Czech Republic polls at 43 percent. In stark contrast to Hungary and the Czech Republic, public support for NATO membership in Poland is over 80 percent. "Hungarian Doubt," *The Economist*, 15 November 1997, p. 54; "Czech Backing for NATO Under 50 Percent," *The New York Times*, 23 December 1997, p. .

29 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "NATO Beyond Enlargement," speech to the UK Atlantic Council, London, 19 November 1997; distributed electronically by NATO.

would need to be traversed. In the near term, this problem could be addressed by transit agreements with Austria, Slovenia, or Switzerland. Those countries are likely to allow such agreements since, in the case of Austria and Switzerland, it is in their interest to have their eastern neighbors defended, and in the case of Slovenia they are currying favor with NATO nations in the hope of eventual accession. Accession of any of those three states to NATO would resolve the problem of transporting forces to Hungary.³⁰

While the new members bring some defense challenges, NATO's significant problems, associated with maintaining adequate defense capabilities, would be present regardless of the alliance's decision to incorporate new members. America's European allies simply are not spending the money required to build forces that can be deployed and maintained outside their home territory. Much less are they keeping pace with U.S. forces' technological advances. Expanding NATO territory by fifteen percent affects the adequacy of NATO defense capabilities only at the margins, especially with the very low threat of aggression against NATO and its new member states. However, the shortcomings of alliance defense capabilities do mean that if NATO were required to make good on its Article V commitment to common defense, most defense of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would be done by American forces. Thus, the incorporation of new members will merely highlight the extent to which NATO defenses already depend on the United States exacerbating NATO's ongoing burdensharing debate.

Organizing Military Operations

NATO is uniquely proficient at planning and conducting multinational military operations. No other organization of nations can approach the military effectiveness of the NATO alliance. The reason for this singular achievement is that NATO has a standing military command that routinely prepares for integrating its member nations forces into a single fighting command.

The integrated military command provides a standing structure of leadership unified under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). NATO is the only alliance that preserves unity of command, the central organizing principle for all military operations; in times of crisis, a military force cannot have two leaders.

This integrated military command provides a methodical system for planning, training and evaluating forces. The defense planning system establishes requirements, such as the size of forces and their availability; identifies necessary equipment and skills; establishes practices and standards that each nation's military will commonly adopt; inspects military performance during exercises; and examines defense budgets to determine each nation's capability to meet NATO-prescribed standards. This combination of a unified leadership structure and a system of routine planning, training and evaluation is NATO's central organizational asset. It is what makes the alliance different from other institutions that aspire to provide security (United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union). It is what gives NATO political clout.

Scholars and policymakers concerned with the long shadow cast by American military dominance in the alliance, expanding the European Union's profile in NATO, or bringing France closer to the alliance frequently suggest alterations to the integrated military command.³¹ While earnestly seeking a better solution to a difficult set of political problems, all of these solutions ignore the basic fact that it is NATO's military architecture that gives the alliance its political strength. And military structures have limits in their flexibility if they are to remain true to the logic and demands of military operations.

The challenges of organizing multinational military operations will not be significantly changed by the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. All of the accession states have declared their intention to fully integrate their military forces into the NATO structure and avoid the proliferation of *a la carte* participation, feared by NATO military leaders.³² NATO's command structure will have to be revised to incorporate military officers from the new member

30 Austria and Slovenia are likely "second tranche" candidates. Austria is already an EU member, and expressing interest in NATO membership. While Austria would seem less sensitive a potential member than former Warsaw Pact states, the post-war Austrian State Treaty commits the Four Powers (The U.S., UK, France and the Soviet Union) to ensure Austria's neutrality and would need to be addressed. Both Austria and Switzerland would need to hold referenda for their governments to accede. Such a referendum would likely pass in Austria, since the issue would be characterized as joining Europe, but may be more difficult in Switzerland.

31 Nichole Gnesotto, "Common European Defence and Transatlantic Relations," *Survival*, Vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 26-27

32 For a thorough discussion of NATO's internal debates, see Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium* (London: Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 1997, ch. 4 "Political Impotence and Military Frustration," p. 82-115.

nations, but the more intractable command issues will remain among its current members. The new members are unlikely to demand representation that displaces major military contributors among the existing NATO nations or disrupts current operation, because the accession states will for several years rely on those countries for defense. The possibility also exists that for the first several years, the combined joint task forces could be utilized to incorporate representation from the new members rather than reapportioning existing NATO billets.

Military forces from the accession states have been familiarizing themselves with NATO standards and operations since 1994, through the Partnership for Peace; by participating in NATO exercises, by beginning to parallel NATO defense planning practices in their national defense cycles, and by fielding forces under NATO command in the former Yugoslavia. In fact, through the Partnership for Peace programs, accession states are already providing information on their defense plans and forces for review in NATO's defense planning process.

The central challenge of organizing military operations will remain negotiating France into any operation. NATO has managed to survive, but never resolve, thirty years of disagreement between France and the United States about warfighting strategy. France never accepted the U.S. principle of graduated escalation that was central to the strategy of flexible response.³³ Ironically, the substantive basis for France's withdrawal no longer exists: U.S. strategy has largely returned to the approach, always supported by France, of employing decisive force to deter aggression and defeat challengers. Yet France cannot reconcile itself to returning to NATO's integrated military command: the 1994 Brussels summit initiatives provide France the opportunity to return to the practices and operations of the integrated military command, without formally rejoining the structures. Nonetheless, the French government under both Prime Ministers Alain Juppe and Lionel Jospin have chosen not to fully participate.

In some ways, France's current position maximizes its leverage over the alliance, since any NATO decision requires French approval, and must be negotiated into any operation. However, the French military, by holding itself outside the practices of the military command, is less capable of participating in multinational coalitions both

within and outside Europe: NATO, not French, standards become the default for nearly all operations.

NATO, too, is diminished by France's voluntary exclusion from the military structure. The alliance spends an inordinate amount of time and effort debating military theology that, as operations in Bosnia have proven, would be unnecessary were France involved in the routine operations of the command.³⁴ France has one of the most capable military forces in Europe, and one of the few that can project power outside its territory—NATO would be a stronger security organization for having full French participation.

Such participation appears unlikely in the near term. The very public French demand for command of the alliance's Southern Region, its refusal to consider any of the alternatives proffered by NATO and American military leaders, and the Alliance's public rejection of France's request have probably poisoned any rapprochement for some time to come.

Maintaining Political Cohesion

Ensuring cohesion is an area of prime concern both internal to NATO and with respect to expansion is maintaining NATO's political cohesion. The issue of cohesion plays out in three dimensions: willingness in principle of members to commonly defend one another, the potentiality for divergent interests, and practical ability to reach consensus within NATO as numbers of participants increase.

Willingness to provide common defense is the linchpin of NATO's political cohesion. A refusal by any member to come to the aid of another would cause irreparable damage to the alliance. During the Gulf War, NATO had a jarring debate over deploying its forces to defend those Turkish airbases from which offensive operations were being conducted against Iraq, but the tension was quickly resolved. While some concern is justified about Polish, Hungarian and Czech willingness to send forces and spend money, for example, to defend Turkey's eastern expanse, that concern is probably less than it is among NATO's existing members. NATO's criteria for selecting accession states included a profession by the states themselves that they would defend all NATO members, bolstered by an evaluation by NATO and that this was so. The new members have an even greater

33 For an excellent assessment of French security policy, see Frederic Bozo, "France," in Michael Brenner, ed., *NATO and Collective Security* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

34 Charles Grant, "Strength in Numbers," p. 32. Having agreement on military issues would, of course, not alleviate the need to coordinate policy.

interest than those in NATO's "rear areas" to uphold the principle of common defense.

The possibility of divergent interests is a more serious concern. Currently, central region states are predominantly concerned with their own central region, southern region states with their own southern area. As Hans Binnendijk has argued, NATO has not resolved the divergent strategies it applies to the two areas: the central region is institutionalist and integrationist, while the southern remains wary of both approaches.³⁵ Further, the more fragile Southern region currently faces a more dangerous security environment, both internally and external to the alliance. Indeed, the arguments for including Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria in the first tranche of NATO expansion, and for the U.S. retaining NATO's Southern command, were based on need to deter aggression and promote stability there.

Yet NATO continues to concentrate on the central region, even though the south is the real fulcrum of Europe's security concerns: for many of the current opportunities for progress in European security are in the center rather than the south. The institutionalized and integrationist approaches are creating confidence, partnerships, and common approaches to security in much of the central region, while the south has demonstrated nowhere near the political momentum or creativity that has propelled central region change.

There are very real limits on progress in cooperation among southern region states. For example, implementation of NATO's command restructuring has been held up for over five years by disagreement between Turkey and Greece over incorporation of an airbase in Larissa, Greece. But NATO must make better progress in the southern region in order to prevent a schism of interests that would very gravely test the alliance. Central region states should not be satisfied just to make central Europe stable.

Inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is unlikely to affect this issue. It is true that Poland and the Czech Republic remain predominantly focused on the central region and will likely reinforce the central region emphasis that currently dominates NATO's political agenda, so that encouraging central region states to become more actively involved in the security concerns of the southern region may therefore be marginally more difficult with the accession of Poland and the Czech Republic. Against this, Hungary is much

more sensitive to the instability in NATO's southern region, because of its proximity to wars in the former Yugoslavia, the effects felt in Hungary of sanctions on Serbia, and its diaspora population in central-southern Europe.³⁶ As a result, Hungary may prove more activist in encouraging the alliance's attention in that direction.

The increasing difficulty of reaching consensus within NATO as numbers increase may prove a serious challenge. Most NATO leaders acknowledge a concern that at some point, the size of alliance membership will become an issue. Decision-making becomes more difficult as the national agendas of increasingly numerous countries must be successfully meshed, and with NATO's unanimity rule, any single nation can prevent action. Consultations require more political attention from NATO's most powerful states as the number of countries consulted grows. If the process becomes too time-consuming or onerous, NATO's most powerful nations may opt out of using the alliance to address their central security concerns. The problems associated with achieving consensus are endemic to the alliance, and probably no more serious at nineteen—and among these particular states—than at the sixteen of NATO's present membership. It is a concern more justified for future expansions than in the current round. And Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as front line states and perchance prime beneficiaries of the security NATO membership provides, have no more reason to disrupt NATO's political cohesion than they do the alliance's military effectiveness.

Keeping America Involved in Europe

Keeping the U.S. in is now perhaps the top priority for NATO's European members.³⁷ The strong pressure for a European security and defense identity (ESDI) from 1990–1995 was motivated in part by concern from European governments that the United States would lose interest in Europe after the Cold War. A U.S. withdrawal of both forces and interest was expected by many Europeans, and that expectation was given momentum by the return to the U.S. of over 200,000 troops previously stationed in Europe; America's willingness to see Bosnia as "a European problem," and the Clinton

36 Geza Jeszinsky, Member of Parliament; former Hungarian Foreign Minister, personal interview, 25 July 1997.

37 Even Germany's Social Democratic Party recently held a conference with the theme "what are we doing for our relationship with America?" See "In Germany, A Formal Burial for Anti-NATO Past," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 January 1998, p. 5.

35 Hans Binnendijk, Director, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, personal interview, 21 January 1998.

Administration's early statements on a turn toward Asia.

As the wars in Bosnia dragged on through 1995, much of the boasting and euphoria dissipated from the ESDI project. In Bosnia, the Europeans realized the limits of their political consensus on foreign policy, the limits of their ability to project military power outside the NATO area without U.S. participation, and, perhaps most importantly, that the United States would actually let them fight a war in Europe without caring to become involved. Only through NATO could American participation be ensured. The Western European alternatives to a NATO-centric European security system all fundamentally depend on the willingness of the United States to become involved in a crisis when Europe wants American involvement. Bosnia demonstrated the vulnerability of that assumption.

America's European allies took away from Bosnia a belief that their security interests are best furthered by convincing the United States to participate in any action from the beginning.³⁸ This realization may be what anchors NATO in the post-Cold War security landscape, because it provides an important reason to maintain NATO's central function of building political consensus on security issues.

Including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO will affect U.S. involvement in Europe only marginally, but likely in positive ways. The United States made expansion happen, and will be centrally involved in the process of translating NATO's new commitments into practical reality. A major American component will be necessary in managing the West's relationship with Russia; providing civilian and military teams that train new members' defense establishments on the defense planning process; rotating in national guard units that increasingly form the core of partnership activities; committing and transporting troops to train in the accession states. These activities will keep the U.S. engaged in European security. Some European governments actually support the expansion of NATO solely to "give the United States a major project that will keep them involved in European affairs."³⁹

The only way enlargement could be detrimental to U.S. involvement in Europe is if accession states expect too great a commitment by the U.S. to problems outside NATO's scope of interest. If, for

example, Hungary were to expect continual support and mediation from the United States on issues relating to Hungarian-Romanian disputes or the treatment of ethnic Hungarians outside of Hungary, the U. S might grow weary of the challenge of building a broader NATO. However, the terms for accession limited the potential for such irritations by requiring advance resolution of border disputes and appreciable progress on outstanding security issues like the treatment of minorities. The new members' interest in keeping the United States attentive to the central mission of NATO's Article V defense pledge makes this over-burdening unlikely. More likely, expansion will remain primarily U.S.-driven for the five-to-ten years it will take to fully incorporate the acceding states into NATO.⁴⁰

In summary, the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will not have a major effect on the NATO alliance, either positive or negative. The danger of re-creating a Russian threat in any form—a recidivist political leadership, reconstituted military forces, diminished security cooperation with the West—remains an overriding concern. The Clinton Administration has, thus far, handled the relationship exceedingly well and the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic does not appear to have caused substantial damage. Further expansion, particularly into territory of the former Soviet Union, would significantly change this equation and damage prospects for a cooperative relationship between Russia and the West.

Enlargement may initially diminish NATO's ability to defend its member states due to the combination of increased territory, basing restrictions, access to Hungary, and the modest defense establishments these countries are maintaining. However, this diminution is offset by the very low threat to NATO. On balance there is little cause for immediate concern about the alliance's ability to carry out its Article V obligations to an expanded membership.

Accepting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic also will have little effect on NATO's ability to organize multilateral military operations. Insofar as the accession states integrate their forces, they will from the start make a contribution to alliance military structures. As their forces become interoperable over time, they could become some of NATO's most important participants.

38 Field Marshal the Lord Vincent, "Foundations for Security in a Changing World," speech to Lloyd's-SB Forum, 7 April 1997.

39 Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman, personal interview, 28 October 1997.

40 This estimate of the timetable was provided by Field Marshal Lord Vincent, former Chairman of the NATO military committee, personal interview, 4 August 1997.

Neither will the challenges of developing and maintaining political consensus in NATO be significantly affected by the first tranche of expansion. Since the accession states are front line states, they have the strongest incentives of all NATO members to ensure a willingness to honor Article V defense guarantees, ensure the effective functioning of the Alliance, prevent divergent interests from stagnating the alliance, and keep the U.S., on whom the military task of defending them would predominantly rest, involved in European security. With only three accession states coming into NATO in 1999, the changes are marginal in terms of NATO's procedures. A second tranche of members could bring these problems into greater focus, however, especially if NATO does not come to better terms on these issues among its current membership.

Beyond NATO Expansion— Policy Prescriptions for a More Secure Europe

The list of security issues that NATO does not, and in many cases cannot, address make clear that

NATO alone cannot make Europe secure. NATO's record is at best mixed in many important areas: supporting democracy, resolving long-standing disputes, engaging in preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, and countering emergent threats. Yet, most of the contemporary challenges to European security concern these issues. In some cases, NATO lacks the structural tools to address the root causes of instability. In other cases, NATO countries lack a political consensus on the issues and are nowhere near developing a common view. In all cases, NATO nations will probably remain chary of using the alliance to address problems that are peripheral to the defense of its member nations, out of concern for diminishing NATO's credibility. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO neither diminishes these sources of instability and insecurity in Europe nor enhances NATO's inability to address them.

Yet these tasks must be undertaken if Europe is to secure the gains of the end of the Cold War. Even under the most positive Western scenarios, NATO alone cannot make Europe secure, simply because there are limits on its ability to support democracy, resolve long-standing disputes, conduct preventative diplomacy, carry out peacekeeping operations, and address emergent threats. What can be done to make Europe more secure?

A New Transatlantic Bargain

First and foremost, NATO needs an updated agreement among its current members, preferably before expansion, on the purposes of the Alliance and the division of labor among its members in those purposes. Stan Sloan recommended a realignment of responsibilities in the alliance in the mid-1980s, and his insight is even more compelling now than a decade ago.⁴¹

The increasing capability of American military forces, especially in terms of technology to increase battlefield awareness and reduce casualties, will make the current dependency of European allies on American military power even more visible and more onerous to both the Europeans and the United States.⁴² For the past seven years, the Europeans have been demanding more latitude and more credit for defense initiatives they undertake independent of the United States, while making very little improvement in those capabilities that would allow operations truly independent of American forces. Certainly the United States has contributed to this dependence by preferring that Europeans invest their relatively scarce defense money on capabilities that do not replicate expensive U.S. assets or require structures independent of NATO to conduct. This history notwithstanding, the time has now come for Europeans to invest in the technological future of their forces, if they expect to have the capability over the coming 25 years to undertake independent operations, or even maintain the ability to fight in genuinely combined operations with U.S. forces.

In return for the European sacrifice of contributing more militarily to the alliance, the United States should make the sacrifice of actual compromise in developing joint policies. The pattern of U.S. interaction with allies in the past several years has been to refuse any participation unless virtually every aspect of a policy suits U.S. preferences.⁴³ Frustration with this approach is apparent in allies' unwillingness to support U.S. policies beyond Europe, as for example, in Iraq. Congressional restrictions on U.S. foreign policies in the form of withholding funding from institutions and opera-

tions further aggravate the situation created by the administration. The United States must be a better ally if it expects to hold the allegiance of its current partners, particularly as the ever-closer union of the EU makes it a formidable competitor to U.S. trade, currency, and services.⁴⁴ Maintaining cooperation amidst competition will be the major internal challenge—and perhaps the paramount security challenge overall—facing the alliance as it turns fifty in 1999.⁴⁵

Postponing Further Expansion

The best contribution the United States and NATO could make to Europe's security remains finding a constructive role for Russia to play in Europe, substantial enough to strengthen Russia's interest in a long-term cooperative relationship with the West. The NATO–Russia Joint Permanent Council is an important structural element for facilitating the relationship, but for the initiative to be successful, the West must be willing to genuinely address Russian security concerns.⁴⁶

The paramount issue with the West for Russians at this time is preventing further NATO expansion, especially onto the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Baltic states will be particularly sensitive because of the large Russian minorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and the geographic proximity of those small states to Russia.

The West should agree to a seven-to-ten year moratorium on further NATO expansion, with the caveat that Russia not become a threat to its neighbors. As a practical matter, a second tranche could take that long in meeting existing NATO standards. Slowing the process of accession talks could be justified on the basis of NATO's internal absorption of the first tranche of new members and the need to reach a stronger political consensus among existing members to make the alliance more worth joining.

If the pace of expansion is slowed, it will be crucial to emphasize that the process remains open and prospective new members will be held to the same standards established for Poland, Hungary

41 Stan Sloan, *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985). Sloan recently made the case again for a new transatlantic bargain along updated terms in *NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense*, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, 1995) McNair Paper #46.

42 Vice Admiral Norman Ray, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, personal interview, 28 October 1997.

43 "America the Unmighty," *The Economist*, 29 November 1997, p. 17; "Even Allies Resent U.S. Dominance," *The Washington Post*, 4 November 1997, p. 1.

44 For a sample of allied aggravation, see articles by Moises Naim and Christophe Bertram in the special issue of *Foreign Policy* "Why the World Won't Play Along," (no. 109, Winter 1997-1998). Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The European Fever," *The Washington Post*, 7 November 1997, p. A25.

45 This belief is also at the center of Philip Gordon's recommendations for preserving and adapting the alliance. See Philip Gordon, "Recasting the Atlantic Alliance," *Survival*, Vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 44–51.

46 This argument has been made by Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO–Russian Relations," *Survival* Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997)

and the Czech Republic. Suggestions that NATO is closed to any further expansion could be destabilizing, both internal to the newly democratizing countries, and with regard to potential aggressors.

Should Russia provoke security concerns in the Baltic states or elsewhere, NATO expansion would return to the forefront of the West's security agenda. This approach would penalize any Russian behavior that NATO expansion had been designed to address, improve the security of those states seeking accession, leave open the West's options if the security situation deteriorates, put on Russia the responsibility for preventing further expansion, and allow greater consideration of other, equally or perhaps more important, measures needed to make Europe secure.

Continue the 1994 Summit Initiatives

The debate on NATO expansion has to a large extent drowned out discussion on the Partnership for Peace and combined joint task force initiatives. Important progress has been made in both programs, and the 1997 Madrid Summit encouraged even more PfP enhancements. These hold great promise for NATO to contribute to Europe's stability beyond its borders and still have substantial room for growth.

Continuing to advance the Partnership for Peace and combined joint task force initiatives will retain NATO's political and military strengths while allowing non-members to increasingly participate in the practices and operations of the alliance. It would retain those elements of NATO most valued by its current members: the Article V defense guarantee, and the integrated military command that makes its claim credible. However, these programs would diminish the distinction between NATO members, who would have a guarantee of mutual defense, and non-NATO members who otherwise participate in alliance activities.

Because nations could choose their level of participation, this option remains less discriminatory than expansion. It would reward those nations doing the most for their own defense by giving them the most credible claim on Western attention and resources—if Poland were participating as fully as any NATO member, it would be difficult to imagine that NATO would not defend Poland even though it lacked a formal guarantee.

This approach would retain NATO as the central core of European security, but would allow those countries that most wanted linkages to the alliance the ability to participate in NATO activities and increase their claims on Western defenses. Because it does not formally breach the boundary

of existing NATO members, this approach is less provocative to Russia. Especially after the initial tranche of NATO expansion, this rationale remains compelling. Including in NATO activities those nations serious about their own security and willing to support a common Western defense allows self-differentiation that is a surer indication of a state's suitability for participating in NATO's central tasks, and meriting the benefits of membership, than any other measure.

This approach allows potential accession states to understand and prepare for the obligations of membership before addressing the potentially divisive issue of expanding NATO membership. Returning to the PfP as the centerpiece of NATO's activity will diminish the difference between NATO members and those not formally in the alliance, which will make easier both cooperation with Russia, and coalitions with neutral states like Sweden, Switzerland and Austria.

This approach also does not distinguish any difference between Russia and other European states, and therefore does not discriminate against Russia in the way that nearly every other index of being "Western" does. Russia's behavior, rather than its history, size, or extent of democratic governance, would determine the extent of its distance from NATO's decisionmaking. Finally, because of the successful reforms of 1991–1994 and 1994–1997, incorporation of new members, and ability to undertake the out-of-area mission in Bosnia, NATO can now be secure enough in its contribution to European security not to need further expansion to diminish concerns about its relevance.

Strengthen the OSCE

The OSCE's broad charter and history as a "process" rather than a treaty preclude enforcement powers, but the OSCE's focus on conflict mediation and management makes early warning and intervention both possible and productive in ways that strategies of economic and military coercion are not. Its fluid structure, relatively small budget, and lack of military resources have created a culture that builds trust, facilitates early involvement, and creates norms enforced by peer pressure.⁴⁷

What would strengthening the OSCE entail? First and foremost, investing greater political capital in the organization. It is little remembered that

47 Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp, "Preventative Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation," in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 27–31.

when the Clinton Administration adopted NATO expansion as U.S. policy, it was intended as one of two tracks, the other being a substantial strengthening of the OSCE to make it a stronger partner and more capable of sharing the burden of European security. Political measures of support would by themselves enhance its credence. Making the regular meetings of heads of state and foreign ministers a more substantive parallel to their NATO and the EU counterparts would be a good place to start.

While the lack of structure may be beneficial to the OSCE's functions, some strengthening of institutions and practices would facilitate a greater OSCE role. Increasing of the Secretary General's responsibilities at the expense of the Chairman in Office would provide greater continuity in policy, as would longer mandates for OSCE missions, and larger budgets.

Russian proposals, many of which are supported by France, for strengthening the OSCE should be weighed carefully. The Russians envision a more traditional collective security organization akin to the United Nations, with an Executive Committee modeled on the Security Council and enforcement powers. This would diminish the OSCE's ability to undertake many of its important tasks early in the course of conflicts while making it a competitor to the UN and NATO. There is no guarantee that states would even then grant the OSCE the political support required to operationalize these roles. However, the case deserves a hearing as a part of the broader discussion of how to make the OSCE more useful.

The OSCE should acknowledge more openly its limitations and to a greater extent refer issues to smaller working groups for policy formulation, team with aid and financial organizations to provide assistance, and mandate other organizations (the UN or NATO) or coalitions for implementation. The OSCE's role would become the mandator and coordinator of a broad political, economic, and military strategy for dealing with conflict. This would give concentrated attention to emerging issues, involve the nations most affected, diminish the burden of decision making at fifty-four, make more direct the negative consequences of refusing cooperation within the OSCE, and provide a clear division of labor between the OSCE and other institutions.

Strengthening OSCE–NATO Links

The OSCE is capable in many areas that can compensate for NATO's weaknesses. It has succeeded in numerous missions throughout Europe to "help set up processes that will get at underlying striv-

ings and discontents before they harden into intractable and violent conflict."⁴⁸ NATO is unlikely to intervene early in a crisis, but the OSCE can. A closer partnership between NATO and the OSCE would create a reliable continuum of crisis management that would improve our ability to respond to Europe's security problems.

A first step in building stronger OSCE–NATO links would be for NATO to accept the need for an OSCE mandate for operations in Europe but outside the NATO area. At the 1992 OSCE and NATO foreign ministers' meetings in Oslo and Copenhagen, both organizations agreed that NATO could undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions for the United Nations and OSCE and that NATO could only undertake out of area missions with a mandate from the UN or OSCE. While NATO members, and particularly the United States, are uncomfortable acknowledging any UN or OSCE right of refusal over NATO actions, as a practical matter, it is already in place.

Oversight by the UN or OSCE is also unavoidable if FNATO is to contribute to these tasks. The need for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions is most likely to occur in regions outside NATO's treaty area, and well within areas of Russian interest. Without Russian support, NATO's current members are very likely to be willing to undertake a military operation in those areas. However, an agreement to seek an OSCE mandate would strengthen the OSCE and give Russia a guaranteed voice in the operation. OSCE oversight is likely to be more to NATO's liking than UN oversight, and substantially less costly. The practice would strengthen the OSCE as an institution, build confidence with Russia that NATO will treat Russia as a partner, and help prevent "new lines in Europe." Further, if NATO organized military operations through the PfP, there is no reason Russians could not participate in, and even lead, these operations. Such an agreement would in no way limit NATO right or ability to carry out its Article V missions, and it could make NATO's growing Article IV role more politically supportable.

Eliminating Redundant OSCE–NATO Activities

Merging parallel fora and functions would reduce competition between NATO and the OSCE and link the two institutions more closely. For example, the newly-created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council could be merged into the OSCE Permanent

48 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 9.

Council—whose functions are essentially the same—reducing the representational burden and competition for both organizations. NATO's willingness to cede some of these activities to the OSCE would build support for the OSCE among those states who now prefer to deal with the Alliance.

A beneficial merger could also be arranged in the area of arms control. NATO's arms control verification commission for the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which was negotiated under CSCE auspices, could transfer its functions to the OSCE. Making the verification commission subordinate to the OSCE could have the added benefit of sharing information more broadly, since that practice has proved to be a significant contributing factor in stability throughout Europe. Consolidating arms control verification and information under the OSCE would enhance the neutral credibility that makes the OSCE's early involvement in crises so effective and important. Merging of arms control inspections and information sharing into the OSCE could subsequently be enhanced by providing information from NATO's defense planning process.

The merging of redundant fora and functions would constitute a significant transfer of authority and day-to-day work load from NATO to the OSCE. This is in both institutions' interests. With NATO's current agenda of defense planning, implementation of the Partnership for Peace and combined joint task forces, preparations for enlargement, and peace enforcement in Bosnia, the Alliance is overworked. NATO estimates that its staff and forces have been reduced by one third while their work load has doubled in the past five years.⁴⁹ The alliance is not in need of the work, and the more important agenda items have led NATO to marginalize the process of arms control and verification, whereas the OSCE could benefit from the responsibility and the tasks contribute to the OSCE's central strengths and functions of mediating long-term disputes.

An OSCE Lead on Arms Control

The arms control agenda in Europe has lagged in the past several years, despite the contribution to security that could be made by creative confidence-building and disarmament measures. In part, arms control has fallen off the policy scope because controlling conflict in Bosnia, NATO enlargement, and the EU economic and monetary union have

forced out most other issues. However, if the practice and process of arms control were vested in the OSCE, they would receive the sustained attention that is currently lacking in other organizations.

The levels of armament in Europe remain substantially higher than the security situation in Europe would seem to demand. While weaponry does not necessarily lead to conflict, the possession of large arsenals can accelerate the destabilization of a fragile situation and inhibit reconstitution of a stable environment. Europe contains enough potential hot spots, especially in its south, to make the maintenance of these capabilities a cause of concern.

The United States should sponsor a broad-ranging OSCE initiative to reduce arms to lower levels even as NATO forces increase their power projection. Reducing the large forces and arsenals in volatile regions would be stabilizing and inspection regimes that review the capabilities of power projection forces can be both a deterrent to potential aggressors and a reassurance to other states. Providing information from NATO and Partnership defense planning through the OSCE to participating nations would be stabilizing and further make NATO structures useful to the broader European community.

One possible direction for further arms limitations could be structured around an extended program of disarmament taking the conventional and nuclear military forces of the CSCE countries down to much lower levels to diminish concerns about attack.⁵⁰ This could be coupled with an intrusive inspections regime and information sharing practices similar to those within NATO to deter cheating and build confidence among participating nations. Such an arms control regime could include mutual security guarantees from all participants that they would rise to the defense of any nation attacked. Nations that retained power projection forces would be prohibited from using them within the treaty area except in their own defense or responding to an attack on other signatories. The approach could make all of Europe's states Europe's policemen and free up funds expended on defense for both the inspection regimes, creation of European power projection forces, and reallocation to the emergent democracies' urgent competing social needs.

⁴⁹ This was reiterated by every senior NATO official, both military and civilian, interviewed.

⁵⁰ This position was advocated in 1989 by General George L. Butler, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), the Joint Staff. Butler believes the U.S. missed an historic opportunity to re-shape Europe by concentrating on preserving NATO's capabilities. General George L. Butler, personal interview, 9 September 1997.

NATO is not in a position to lead the arms control agenda. Its restricted membership makes it less well situated to address broad arms control measures than the more inclusive membership of the OSCE. Lacking another bloc with which to negotiate, NATO will be the only institution at the table, which is unlikely to stimulate Russian interest in arms reductions. The substantial military capabilities of its members will undercut its credibility, as does the fact that its members are some of the world's largest arms merchants.

The OSCE could become a clearing house for information on arms sales and holdings among all its member states. This would increase transparency in arms holdings throughout Europe, which could be stabilizing, and could also spur interest in arms reductions. As was the case with human rights, OSCE involvement could eventually contribute to development of a norm against the most egregious arms sales, changing nations' behavior.

The practical knowledge and intelligence support required for arms control verification would reside in NATO, at least initially, but sharing between the two organizations would strengthen their linkages. As the OSCE developed greater capacity in these areas, its political importance and credibility would also increase.

Greater Regional Cooperation

The one shortcoming of the Partnership for Peace approach initially was that it focused primarily on bilateral relations between nations and NATO.⁵¹ The bilateral basis served the important purpose of preventing Russia from inhibiting relations between Partners and NATO. The stage at which bilateral programs were necessary has passed, as NATO has acknowledged.⁵² Regional security would be enhanced by invigorating regional roundtables, both within NATO's PfP and in the OSCE.

Two areas of particular concern are the Baltic and the Caucasus. The Baltic states are unlikely to be admitted into NATO in the near term. In order to prevent a "Korean syndrome" in which the Baltic states are considered outside the U.S. security interests, the Baltic states should be actively engaged by NATO members bilaterally and multilaterally. This approach has long been the practice of Denmark, some Scandinavian countries, and most

recently, the United States.⁵³ Russia has demonstrated a willingness to work constructively toward lowering tensions in the Baltic and should be included in discussions and negotiations as long as this trend continues. The need for continued mediation of minority issues, as well as the clear path toward coercive measures should Russia become a threat to the Baltic states argues for a joint OSCE-NATO initiative.

The United States should also support an ongoing multilateral discussion of security issues in the Caucasus. One possible direction would be negotiations under OSCE auspices with a quad of Western, Russian, Ukrainian and rotating Caucasian representation in the lead. NATO would be well served by giving Turkey the public leadership role for the West, with careful and frequent consultation to ensure Turkish leadership reflects NATO's interests. Such an approach would visibly demonstrate NATO's support for Turkey, provide an example of a secular Muslim country in an area where states are struggling with the development of national identities, bring Russia into the negotiation as an equal partner but not dominant force over the former Soviet countries, and demonstrate patterns of dispute management and resolution that could contribute to stability in a volatile area of concern to both NATO and Russia. It would also be useful to encourage the budding relationship between Turkey and Ukraine as a way to build cooperation in the region, enhance Ukraine's ability to pursue policies independent of Moscow, give Ukraine links to NATO, and temper Russian influence in the Caucasus.⁵⁴

A joint German-Turkish lead for the West would be even better, if it could be agreed, because it could give those states common cause on a divisive bilateral issue. The Germans may develop a greater sense of the security concerns driving militarized Turkish policies. The Turks may draw Germany into more constructive ways of expressing their concerns and becoming a more active part of the solution to the region's problems.

53 Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival* Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 126, 130-132; and Stephen Blank, *NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997). The U.S. has recently become more involved in this area, as the U.S.-Baltic Charter demonstrates. See "Russia Faults U.S.-Baltic Charter As An Unwise Choice for Security," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 January 1998.

54 F. Stephen Larabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," *Survival* Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 159.

51 Charles Kupchan, "Reviving the West," *Foreign Affairs* 75, 3 (1996).

52 Among initiatives announced at the July 1998 Madrid Summit to strengthen the Partnership for Peace was to strengthen regional cooperation for exercises and in the exchange of information.

Conclusion

The NATO alliance remains the center of European security debates because it has succeeded, both during and after the Cold War, in its central tasks of building political consensus, managing threats, defending its member states, capably organizing multinational military operations, and keeping the United States involved in Europe.

The incorporation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will not affect either these tasks or fundamentally change the alliance's ability to successfully conduct them. Further expansion of the alliance could significantly affect NATO's ability to do so, however, especially if former Soviet states were included.

Instead of giving our political attention to a second tranche of NATO expansion, we should be crafting a sustainable transatlantic bargain, continuing to enhance the Partnership for Peace and combined joint task force initiatives, strengthening

the OSCE, merging redundant NATO and OSCE functions and fora, emboldening the OSCE to lead Europe on arms control, and establishing multilateral regional roundtables on security in Europe's most volatile regions.

These initiatives will seem inadequate to those who favor expansion to defend states from a recidivist Russia or the whirlpool of ethnic and border conflicts emerging in some parts of Europe. It will also disappoint those who believe NATO serves a civilizing function preventing conflict by making its members definitively "Western." However, these measures will ultimately contribute more to European security than the current expansion, or future expansions, of NATO can. NATO alone cannot make Europe secure, but partnered with a strengthened OSCE, in which both institutions contribute their strengths, compensate for the other's weaknesses, and stretch to address emergent security concerns, together they can consolidate the gains of the end of the Cold War.

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