

POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH



Monthly bulletin on Moldova
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The Bulletin is a bilingual monthly publication aiming to provide analysis on various elements of domestic and foreign policy, as well as on some issues of special interest for Moldova. In order to accurately monitor the major trends and developments, the Institute of Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) "Viitorul" calculates the Political and Security Statewatch (PSS) indicators. The PSS indicators are calculated using a special methodology.*

The Dynamics of PSS Indicators for the Period June-July, 2005

Indicator	May-June Average	June-July Average	Dynamics
Domestic Policy	3,7	3,25	↗
Foreign policy	3,6	3,09	↗
Security Policy	3,68	3,19	↗

welfare were touched upon by certain adds and modifications to the existing laws on Occupation of Individuals in Search for Employment, on Social Alimonies and Welfare for certain categories of population. The most important acts in this field were, however, the modifications of the Law on State Social Security Budget for the year 2005.

1. Domestic policy

The relatively large bulk of laws adopted on the last hundred meters by the Parliament of Moldova show a new move of solidarity by the political forces of the country. The "Decalogue", put forward by the parliamentary factions to President Voronin during his last re-election on April 4, brought new hope to the seemingly divided adversaries to establish a lasting truce and solve the anguishing problems of Moldovan politics.

The question then raised by the political thinkers was: will the President keep his promises given to the opposition? The question now is: is the truce strong enough to lead to modernization and Europeanization?

The education field was covered by a set of modifications of the Law on Education oriented towards fostering the adherence to the Bologna Process. Another spark was the elaboration of the Code of Education that is intended to be released for examination by the state institutions and civil society.

As for Foreign Policy, the Parliament ratified around 20 agreements to which Moldova previously adhered. The most important acts were, however, those regarding the Transdnestrian conflict: 3 declarations, one public appeal regarding the settlement plan set forth by President of Ukraine and the most important one: the Law on the Basic Provisions of the Status of Settlements on the Left Bank of the Dniestr River.

The reason of this "laundry list" of legislative activity is to display that approximately 70 percent of the objectives in the "Decalogue" have been reached during the first session of the Parliament. Another set of modifications have strengthened the mutual trust of the parties in the political truce. These modifications touch upon the interest of each of the parties. The modified laws are: the Law on the Superior Council of Magistrates, the Law

1.1. Legislative Efficiency

The final discourse of Parliamentary Speaker, Marian Lupu, accounted for a total of 212 laws passed by the legislators during plenary meetings 29.

The law on the state budget was tackled regarding the distribution of budgetary incomes of 790 Million Lei, accumulated during the 1st semester of the year.

The modifications in Titles 7 and 8 of

the Fiscal Code extended the tax administration powers of local public authorities. The new incursion into the tax laws set the next year's fiscal policy priorities. The modifications lowered the income tax and settled the lacunas in the VAT regulations for agriculture. The Law on Investment Funds was modified alongside by providing the shareholders with a set of warranties and raise transparency in investment procedures.

The social security, health care and

* The calculation methodology of the Political and Security Statewatch Indicators

The PSS methodology is a synthetic model designed to evaluate the perception of a pool of 10 independent experts on political and security risks in three areas: Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy and Issues of Special Interest. The PSS monitoring contributes to the identification of potential and effective threats that impact the stability of public institutions and assures the coherence of early warning analyses. The PSS rating should not be considered an absolute indicator. The reason for PSS indicator is to form general ideas. The dynamics of PSS indicators can be found throughout the text of the PSS and reflects the rhythm and the direction of democratic changes occurring in Moldova. To find out more about the methodology, check the addenda.

on the Court of Accounts, the Election Code, the Law on the Information and Security Service. According to the conditions of the Decalogue, the Parliament became more transparent allowing for the broadcasting the plenary sessions on national television and radio. The verbal reports of each session are published on Parliament's website.

The assessment of the legislative process in Moldova allows for the conclusion that the

spring sessions were generally determined by the rules of a conditional partnership between the power and the opposition over European integration. Europe assessed the cooperative Parliament as premises for internal stabilization; that being a good environment for the implementation of the Moldova-EU Action Plan and the Strategy for Economic Growth and Eradication of Poverty.

The political consensus hasn't eliminated the structural divide between the power and the opposition. It should be noted that the unprecedented concessions made by the communist majority, which form the base of the political truce, do not necessarily lead to a better implementation of the Moldova-EU Action Plan and the Strategy for Economic Growth and Eradication of Poverty.

The voted laws were, in their majority, proposed by the Government, the President and the Communist majority. Another anomaly is the oppositions rush to vote and ignore the debate. Has the opposition lost its role? The opposition in Moldova is undergoing a profound change, altering its traditional watchdog role, by recognizing that time has come, when the powers ceased to face each other from the top of irreconcilable barricades.

A good part of the initiatives discussed by the current Parliament are old legislative packages left by the previous legislatures. Although these laws lacked innovation and even political relevance in the new Parliament, the opposition squandered a large amount of time on those. The opposition's tactics of "Let's vote it, however it may be and then come back later to improve it!" has been time-consuming and pointless. The legislative instability caused by the vicious circle of rush votes and later improvement comebacks, affects the operation of public authorities and, therefore, the investment climate. May 2004 alone accounted for

322 amendments out of just 23 of the laws adopted between 2001 and 2003. Another 58 out of the 96 laws enacted by the present legislature are amendments or improvements of prior reckless vote.

In order to increase the efficiency of the legislative activity, a presidential decree dating April 20 instituted 7 ad-hoc

58 out of the 96 laws posted on the Parliament website are amendments or complements

working groups to monitor the adjustment of the national legislation to the European standards, especially in the fields of: elections, media and broadcasting, justice, local public administration, public financial control, security and Constitutional modernization. The role of the ad-hoc groups has been purely consultative. The groups did not take the form of parliamentary commissions, nor have their findings been subject to vote. In fact, the only thing discussed in the Parliament referring to the ad-hoc commissions was their "artificial" creation. The endless debate over the relevance of their creation, rather than their recommendations took the bulk of the time dedicated to the commissions. The work of the ad-hoc commissions was not, by any means, effective and fruitful. A vivid example is the work of the Local Public Administration Committee. The Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (SEGPR), enacted at the end of 2004, stipulates a stronger partnership of local public administration and civil society to enhance local governance. The civil society is supposed to ensure a more modern, accountable and transparent governing process. However, the LPA ad-hoc commission work turned to be nothing more but a decorative set of stipulations with little practical implications. Paired with Parliament's indifference, the commissions turned to be another political squander.

The legislative initiatives of President Voronin regarding the legal status of breakaway eastern region of Transnistria and the fuss around the so-called "Yushenko Plan" distracted the attention of the local and international public eye from the domestic political developments. The political consensus, in this case, gives more power to the power. Voronin and the Communist Party are gaining more and more western credit every day, regardless of the numerous power abuses and obvious deficiencies of the internal democratic system.

It seems the lawmaking efforts by the Parliament deputies have been less keen on European integration lately. Despite the

firm declarations made by all political factions on the starting day of the current legislature, an insignificant amount of laws regard the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Moldova-EU Action Plan. This attitude can cement EU's doubts about the consistency of Moldovan leadership in terms of meeting European integration requirements, fact that could condemn Moldova to a long time knocking on the door to Europe.

The lawmakers lack a strategic vision on prioritizing laws of extreme importance for the internal development of the country. Cardinal reforms are painstaking, like the reforms in the central administration of the country, the reform of the Supreme Security Council, etc. The voting of important legislation has been rather reckless, ignoring the benefits of analysis and expert advice. Some of the laws, like the Law on Assigning the Status of Object of Cultural Heritage to the "Milestii Mici" Wine Factory, were decided upon regardless of obvious concern from the part of the permanent commissions.

The activity of the Parliament proves that Moldova is far from being a functioning democracy, where legislative action is oriented towards creating a favorable environment for the public institutions to operate a socially oriented public policy. It seems, after all, that the Public institutions are driven, in Moldova, by other interests.

1.2. How much do the Government and the Presidency do to Foster European Integration?

The top priorities of the Government's activity have been: economic development, territorial reintegration of the country, raising the life standards and European integration. The Government reasserted the objectives defined before by the President of Moldova, the most important being the implementation of the Strategy of Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (SEGPR) and the Moldova-EU Action Plan.

The implementation of these complex programs requires joint effort, dedication and professionalism by all public agencies. Because of the enor-

mous amount of work, the Government cannot reconcile the handling of certain programs. The common approach of this Government in handling past issues demonstrates a risk of everything being implemented according to the possibilities, not according to the requirements.

The main preoccupation of the Government during the first two summer months has been the restructuring of ministries and departments. As result, the structure and personnel of 20 central public institutions was approved. Pressed by the unsolved problems from his first mandate and compelled to perform restructuring and, along that, dismissals and staff cuts, Premier Vasile Tarlev knows he's under close watch by his and the President's adversaries.

The Premier's chances to survive in this office are closely tied to the President, whose political ratings are in permanent rise. Because of that circumstance and abnormally for a parliamentary democracy, the Premier will become the President's marionette. As consequence, all of the Government's movers will require coordination with the presidential councilors. The priorities for the Government's activity will be set in the President's office. Consequently, Vladimir Voronin, keeps on imposing his absolute authority in all spheres of state power, in typical style of an army general. The lack of autonomy of public institutions denotes an acute deficit of democracy.

It shouldn't be a surprise that the most important legislative acts referring to the security sector reform and the Transnistrian issue come from the President. This fact contributes to the rise in the political ratings of Vladimir Voronin, both domestically and internationally. The President's successes shade down the activity of the opposition. In the meantime, Voronin's initiatives cannot be criticized, as they turn to successfully promote the state interests.

Nonetheless, behind this euphoria national success in European integration


and declarations about settling the Transnistrian conflict lay deep shortcomings in the field of democratic reform, modernization and European integration. There is little real success in the reformation of economy, in public institutions and social policy.

Regardless of the fact that the prospectus for the Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, enacted in 2004, can be found on the bureau of every of the Moldovan Ministers, it is only now that a National Council for Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction was created to coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. And again, it was a presidential initiative. The

as law. The signing of this plan, the quality of which is doubtful, at least when delimiting the responsibilities between the various state institutions, is regarded as a clear achievement for the European integration of Moldova. As in the case of SEGPR, the implementation of the Moldova-EU Action Plan is advancing with snail speed. No one in the Government of Moldova, except for the Prime Minister, is responsible for its implementation. The job of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was done in the moment of signing of the plan by the representatives of Moldova and the European Commission.

The representatives of the EU troika declared, during a visit of documentation in Chisinau, their hopes that real results will already be visible during the meeting of the Moldova-EU Cooperation Council the upcoming November. The President said he sees no problem with the schedule. It is also awkward to find out, from the President, that the Plan has a detailed timeline. Unfortunately, the timeline was not, and still isn't, made public. The real implementation of the Plan requires elaboration of sound strategic projects of profound domestic reform. That is the only possibility to reach European standards.

The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the domestic policy for the period of June-July, 2005



The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest

Indicators	April-May average	May-June average	June-July average	Dynamics
Domestic Policy	3,73	3,7	3,25	⬆️

late, summer 2005, creation of this indispensable institution raises serious concerns about the progress of the Poverty Reduction strategy during the whole winter, spring and summer. The implementation span of the SEGPR being 2004-2006, it is alarming to find out that the coordinating body came as late as summer of 2005. The lack of a clear strategic vision over the economic and political from the decision-making bodies, paired with severe lack of concrete actions, turn important and enormously expensive plans like SEGPR into means of disseminating populist propaganda.

Another document of primary importance for solving the social, economic and European integration problems is the Moldova-EU Action Plan, signed at Brussels and adopted by the Parliament

1.3. Forecast

The settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, democratization of public life and European Integration were the objectives that lead to the creation of the political consensus. The most important result of this qualitative shift in the inter-party relations refers to Transnistria.

The boldness of such actions proved the vulnerability of big geopolitical figures, like Russia. Russia's incapacity to temper its imperial ambitions could give a new impetus for the domestic policy in Moldova.

The involvement of Russia will continue to shift from "hard security"

threats to more "soft" methods, like economic pressures, media and other actions aimed to destabilize the internal political environment, to undermine the democratic political process in Moldova. The goal of these maneuvers is the recognition of Transnistria under Russian mandate.

The external threat could bring the power and the opposition to unity. New divergences could appear on the grounds of Voronin's leave from the office of President of the Communist Party of Moldova. The

privatization could also generate conflict.

The lack of a clear vision of European integration and the scarce understanding of the European political process by the Government will impede any evolution in conducting domestic reform according to the benchmarks of the European Union.


The continuous ignoring of the Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction and the Moldova-EU Accession Plan from the part of the Government can ham-

per the process of European Integration of Moldova.

The legislative and executive activity during this summer proves that the authorities of Moldova continue to avoid handling the anguishing issues of Moldovan society, such as the weakness of the state and its inefficiency in applying its own decisions. These all factors combined bring serious damage to the development of Moldova and to its European integration.

Addendum

Table 1. The evolution and intensity of sub variables of the domestic policy in April-May 2005



What is the PSS Indicator ?:

The indicator is intended to describe the rhythm and direction of the democratic changes happening in Moldova, through a qualified evaluation of the variables representing concepts of domestic and foreign policy, as well of some special interest issues.

The PSS indicator is calculated in function of the answers given by a group of independent experts. The role of the expert group is to assign values of 1 to 5, to the variables measuring the above-mentioned concepts. The value 1 represents the highest level of intensity of a variable, 5 being the lowest. The evaluation of the results was done by using an evaluation table.

I. Domestic Policy	April- may average	May- June average	June- July average	Dynamics
Questions				
Q1. Are Moldovan central public authorities efficient and competitive?	3,89	4	3,1	↑
Q2. Is the political system in the Republic of Moldova pluralist, democratic and viable?	3,6	3,4	3	↑
Q3. Are the human rights respected in the Republic of Moldova?	3,3	3	3,05	↔
Q4. Is the principle of power separation respected in Moldova?	4,1	4,4	3,21	↑
Q5. Are women, national minorities and other minorities encouraged to participate in the political life and public life of Moldova and?	2,8	2,5	2,9	↓
Q6. Is the electoral legislation according to the democratic norms and standards? Are there mechanisms that ensure equal chances to all the electoral competitors within the electoral campaign?	3,4	3,6	3,5	↑
Q7. Are the citizens of the Republic of Moldova protected from administrative abuses and political reprisals?	3,8	3,6	3,5	↑
Q8. Is the Moldovan Justice independent and trustworthy?	4,1	4,1	3,45	↑
Q9. Are the local public authorities decentralized and do they benefit from regional and local autonomy?	4,2	3,9	3,5	↑

2. Foreign Policy

2.1. The Moldova-EU Relations

Moldova urges for constructive dialog with the EU aimed to build grounds for the country's main aspirations: democratization, territorial reintegration and EU accession. These aspirations have become clearer since June 28, after the signing of an agreement regarding the establishment, privileges and im-

munities of the European Commission Delegation to Moldova. The aim of the delegation is to enhance the cooperation between the two parties, providing support to the implementation of the Moldova-EU Action Plan and advancing a solution to the Transnistrian conflict.

The Moldova-EU Action Plan stipulates the creation of such an institution

as one of the EU engagements. As for the engagements of Moldova, official sources are silent. Declarations, such as: "The provisions of the Moldova-EU Action Plan are the first priorities of the political, economic and social reform agenda in Moldova".

The approval of the Moldova-EU Action Plan by the European Parliament came together with the EU

requirements for the Autonomous Commercial Preferences for Moldova. The commercial requirements, together with Action Priorities are also reflected in the Moldova-EU Action Plan. They consist of benchmarks for the development of the required institutional background and origin control procedures for the goods produced in Moldova. The Autonomous Commercial Preferences are the doorway for an asymmetric trading regime between Moldova and the EU and, therefore, a step ahead for the further economic development and European integration.

Unfortunately, the Moldovan authorities keep on ignoring these benchmarks. The European institutions have repeatedly asserted that Moldova's chances of integrating into EU depend largely on responsible actions of the Moldovan leadership. At the present, the actions are still scarce.

2.2. A good Turn for Moldova in the North Atlantic

Step forward for the Moldova-NATO relations, as Moldova is upgrading its participation in the Euro-Atlantic structures by being granted an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Moldova has been an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 1994, until President Voronin's request for closer cooperation with the North-Atlantic Alliance was positively replicated by Brussels. It should be noted; however, that the Individual Partnership Action Plan is much less about affection than it is about firm, coherent and measurable engagement.

The official start for IPAP will be preceded by the elaboration an outline Concept, stating clearly the goals of the country's foreign, internal, security and defense policies and its expectations regarding NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic community. Moldova has to start looking for its place amidst the allies, of course for when the political, technical and security arrangements allow

that.

It is expected for the IPAP to be signed in the first semester of 2006, after rigorous internal and external evaluation and preparations. Having been approved by the Supreme Security Council, the Plan will pass into the implementation phase, a period of precise and rigorous monitoring by the new security "allies".

The burden of drafting fell onto the newly-formed National Commission for the Elaboration of the Moldova-NATO Action Plan. The Commission presided by Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Valeriu Plesca, Minister of Defense, will combine the efforts of the main civilian and military state structures, academic institutions and civil society. It is believed that experts from the Baltic states will be invited for expertise.

The IPAP could create solid ground for a more convincing pursuit of the country's key foreign policy objective: accession to the European Union. The Chisinau authorities finally came up to understanding that EU accession implies, besides serious institutional commitments, a strong set of security warranties and NATO is the

not be an exception. Therefore, EU integration for Moldova became closely tied to NATO.

IPAP will be implemented simultaneously to the Moldova-EU Action Plan. The IPAP could be a powerful instrument for EU accession. IPAP could be a valuable contribution to the institutional development required by the European integration process. For Moldova, IPAP has important domestic implications such as: the reform of the security sector, settled relations with the neighboring countries and improved interoperability between the Moldovan defense structures and their NATO analogues.

It is not easy to set clear projections of what impact the new Moldova-NATO arrangement will have on the Transnistrian issue. It is expected, though, that Transnistria will become a major security concern for NATO and will affect its relations with its strategic partners, including Russia. The latter would have to lose a lot, while trying to insist on the so-called "strategic interests", which are, in fact, backing the secessionist regime in Tiraspol. Chisinau could, at its turn,


reframe its discourse for Transnistria, downplay collective security, call for a more active implication of the international community and promote demilitarization of the enclave.

Skeptics argue that the Moldova-NATO plan is highly over-rated mostly because of its limited scope. Indeed, IPAP does not necessarily imply accession to NATO, even in the foreseeable perspective. Moreover, IPAP could tolerate neutrality, which is convenient for the authorities, but loudly repudiated by the community of political analysts in Chisinau. The Individual Part-

nership Action Plan focuses primarily on the Alliance's priorities in the region: the war on terror, military reform and maximizing security by providing political and economic

This September, a European Union delegation will be open in Moldova

The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the foreign policy for the period of June-July, 2005



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Indicators	April-May average	May-June average	June-July average	Dynamics
Foreign Policy	3,5	3,6	3,09	⬆️

only provider of those. The pattern has been irrefutably valid for all EU accession candidate countries. Considering the security challenges facing the country in the present, Moldova cannot and should

benefits. IPAP benefits are significantly higher than the ones channeled through PFP. Along that, IPAP means that NATO will provide assistance without being actively engaged.

The skeptics should consider learning the Georgian lesson of gradual accession. Georgia has benefited from a similar plan since October 2004. IPAP gave the country immense support in reforming its army, secret services, border troops and senior military personnel. Moreover, Irakli Okruashvili, the country's Defense Minister, vociferated Georgia's intent to request a Membership Accession Plan (MAP) to NATO the next autumn. Georgia's progress during IPAP convinced the United States to start a Stabilization Operations Program in continuation of Equipment and Training Program Geor-

gia benefited from 1999.

The pro-NATO intentions have already brought results. The USA promised to provide assistance in accounting and retrieving ammunition from Transnistria. Moldovan Defense Minister, Valeriu Plesca received assurances from the US Senate about the intentions of the latter to lobby the retrieval of Russian troops from Moldova through the US Ambassador to Moscow. As in the case of Georgia, a US Senate resolution supporting the retrieval of Russian troops and ammo would be of a much greater help. Enhancing the relations with the United States, NATO's political and financial core should be a priority for Moldova.

IPAP does not necessarily mean NATO accession, but it gives more chances for entering the EU

In the long run, Moldova should revise the status of neutrality, so as to not waste the opportunity of continuing the cooperation with NATO on a more superior stage. That could halt Russia's imperial ambitions for Moldova. In the medium run, Moldova should seek active NATO involvement in applying the 3D strategy in Transnistria.


It should be mentioned that the start of Moldova-NATO partnership has had a positive impact on the image of Moldova in Europe. Pro-Moldovan declarations blare from Washington DC to Brussels and Tallinn. It is very important that the Plan became an action platform of Moldova's integration into the European security system, but not just another formal achievement of the current power.

Addendum

Table nr.2 The evolution and intensity of the sub variables of the foreign policy in April-July 2005

II. Foreign Policy	April-May average	May-June average	June-July average	Dynamics
Questions				
Q1. Is Moldova's foreign policy clearly stated and promoted according to the main actors of the international community?	3,1	3,4	2,4	↑
Q2. In your opinion, are all agreements and conventions ratified by the Republic of Moldova respected and implemented?	3,11	3,3	3,2	↑
Q3. Is the Republic of Moldova protected enough through agreements and strategic partnership on the external arena?	3,5	3,5	3,4	↑
Q4. Is there an effective open dialog between the government and civil society and does it create and promote an efficient and trustworthy foreign policy?	3,9	4,1	3,35	↑
Q5. Is there efficient cooperation between Moldova and its neighboring countries within the framework of regional and international organizations?	3,5	3,2	2,9	↑
Q6. Are the Moldovan authorities effectively engaged in implementing the UE-Moldova Action Plan?	3,6	3,7	2,95	↑
Q7. Is the Euro-Atlantic integration a priority of the Moldovan foreign policy?	4,1	3,8	3,4	↑

Table nr.2 the evolution and intensity of the sub variables of the foreign policy in April- June 2005



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The evaluation of the results was done by using an evaluation table.

3. Issues of Special Interest

3.1. Developments in the Transnistrian Issue

On July 22, 2005, the Parliament of Moldova almost unanimously adopted the Law on the Special Legal Status of the Settlements on the Left Bank of the Dniestr River. According to the new law, Transnistria is a territorial-administrative autonomy within the unitary state of Republic of Moldova. The law ensures the delegation of political competences to the governing bodies of the autonomy, in the meantime providing internal warranties according to the Moldovan Constitution.

The law is a brave and unconventional deed for Moldova's domestic policy. The adoption of the law put an end to a long period of external pressure, diplomatic errors, Western indifference and Russian cynicism. The law has tremendous public support. According to CBS Axa-operated poll dating from July 2005, 72 percent of the population is against any federalization solution.

Although it was stated that the 22 July law was adopted in line with the "Yushchenko" Plan of settling the conflict, the lawmakers in Chisinau introduced new and fundamentally important modifications. The modifications created an important conceptual and instrumental shift aiming towards the realization of the final objective: territorial reintegration of Moldova.

The Ukrainian plan had a handful of shortcomings, highlighted by President Vladimir Voronin in his talks with the North-Atlantic Council and European Parliament on June 7. By omitting clauses referring to the evacuation of Russian troops, to the control over the Moldo-Ukrainian border, to the democratization and decriminalization of the breakaway enclave, the settlement plan is futile. Moreover, internationally-backed elections in Transnistria would, according to the compelling majority

of politicians in Chisinau, legitimize a separatist and brutal regime, installed by foreign intervention.

Moldova responded on June 10, by adopting a set of formal declarations, considerations and appeals regarding the "Yushchenko" settlement plan, the democratization and demilitarization of the region. The actions of Moldovan lawmakers rang alarm bells in Russia.

The Moscow officials warned Chisinau that the law will deteriorate the already tensioned relations with separatist Tiraspol. The warning was immediately backed by Defense Minister, Ivanov, who declared again that Russia will not withdraw the ammunition because of the Transnistrian authorities. The comment of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs qualified the 22 July Law on the status of Settlements in Transnistria as a poorly thought act that will impede the negotia-

actual geostrategic arrangements and of ignoring the provisions of bi- and multilateral agreements.

The Kiev politicians were slightly surprised by the 22 July law. Kiev said it could go too far. The reaction of the Ukrainian leadership is overall favorable to Moldova. In the meantime, it is strikingly ambiguous. Although the law conforms the Ukrainian plan of conflict settlement in Transnistria, it

exceeds the limits of the aforementioned plan. The Ukrainians implied a series of political inconveniences generated by the differences between the "Yushchenko" plan and the 22 July law. One of the inconveniences is linked to the participation of the Transnistrian people in elaborating the status of the Transnistrian autonomy. The Ukrainian leaders want that to happen only after elections are held in the region. According to the Ukrainian special Ambassador in Moldova, Dmitri Tkaci, the law "... is not exactly a tragedy. It is just the starting position of the Government in Chisinau."¹ Tkaci declared that the 22 July law is a basis for the future work on the status of Transnistria. He said the inconvenient clauses will be settled down by compromise and a final draft law will be designed to fit the interests of all parties.


It is to be mentioned that the new law is the legal expression of the "3D" strategy set forth by the leaders of Moldovan civil society in the autumn of 2004. Their position was that "The key

for the final settlement of the conflict is in the political commitment for the democratization, demilitarization and decriminalization of the Eastern region of Moldova." The 22 July

Note:
1. <http://azi.md/news?ID=35252>

The Transnistrian conflict still is the most sensitive issue of Moldova's domestic and foreign policy. The actions of Moldovan policymakers caused mixed feelings.

The PSS indicator reflects the stability level in the security Policy for the period of June-July, 2005



The values are calculated on an inverted scale, where 1 is the highest value and 5 is the lowest

Indicators	April-May average	May-June average	June-July average	Dynamics
Security Policy	3,79	3,68	3,19	↑

tion process. The retrieval of ammunition was again declared unacceptable by the Russian government. The Moldovan Foreign Ministry followed up with a public protest regarding the declarations made by Russian authorities. The latter were accused of reckless neglecting of

law is, apparently, a firm step within the formulation of Moldova's position regarding the future framework of settlement of the conflict and an ideal solution for the Moldovan state.

In order to be realistic, we should mention that the adoption of the 22 July Law by the Moldovan Parliament did not spur foreign enthusiasm. The explanation holds to the fact that the law actually changes the rules for the negotiation process. The OSCE, the mediators and EU had third own math in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Moldova will have a hard time asserting the new realities.

The OSCE reaction was nonetheless ambiguous. The national delegations to the OSCE Permanent Council approved the 22 Law on the status of Transnistria. The delegations estimated that "[the Law] should lead to a quick and final solution of the conflict, on the basis of the norms and principles of the international law, particularly on the norms referring to territorial integrity, sovereignty and intangibility of international borders."

Despite all that, it seems the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is home to critics of the 22 law. Proposals to provide international warranties to Transnistria, in case the internal ones will not be enough have been given voice in the PA. These calls endanger one of the main advantages of the law: the absence of any warranties, so frequently invoked in the past by

the Russian negotiators to legitimize Russian military presence in Moldova. These calls, like the one belonging to Kimmo Kiljunen, prove the extensive moral support Russia has in the parliamentary bodies of OSCE.

Although just an observer to the conflict settlement negotiations, the United States expressed its support for the democratization and disarmament of Transnistria. The US also urged for the evacuation of Russian troops and ammunition as agreed in Istanbul in 1999. The US also expressed hope that the 22 July law will resuscitate the negotiation process, where the US should be more actively involved.

3.2. Forecast

None of the parties in the conflict settlement negotiations regards the 22 July law to be a final draw on the status of the Transnistrian enclave. Russia will continue insisting on a revised and "internationally" approved status document for Transnistria. The possibility of any move forward in the issue of disarmament in Transnistria is at the same low as in the years following the OSCE Istanbul agreement. Moldova's adherence to the stipulations of the new law on the status of Transnistria and Russia's stand back on the disarmament issue can stall the negotiations for a while.

The negotiations could be restarted from Ukrainian initiative, as the joint border control and customs checkpoints are

about to take shape.

The Ukrainian discomfort with the 22 July law streams from the difficulties this law provokes for the Ukrainian leaders to urge the legalization, through elections, of the Tiraspolian regime. With the coming of the EU-monitored common Moldo-Ukrainian customs checkpoints, Ukraine needs a legitimate commercial partner in Transnistria to keep the trade unaffected by the limitations EU monitoring will bring.

The hope that the democratic factors – actors of the "Orange" revolution – will come up to providing a non-partisan help to Moldova is rapidly melting.

The new orientation of Moldova towards the Euro-Atlantic structures adds a new challenge to Russia and its strategy in Moldova. A more active Russian implication on the side of the separatist government will alert the international community that will, definitely, be against a consolidating Russian enclave on the Eastern border of NATO and EU. From this perspective, maintaining troops and of providing military, political and financial support to the secessionist regime of Tiraspol will become too costly. And, hopefully not even the authoritarian administration of Putin will be able to keep it.

Table 3. The evolution and intensity of the sub variables of the security policy in April- July 2005

I. Security Policy	April-May average	May-June average	June-July average	Dynamics
Questions				
Q1. In case of an outside aggression can the Republic of Moldova defend itself properly?	4,44	4,33	3,95	↑
Q2. Compared to the situation of 1 year ago, is the Republic of Moldova a state that is more viable and secure concerning the energetic and oil resource in report with the growing needs?	4	3,89	3,4	↑
Q3. Is Moldova's position well protected by international /regional agreements and/or treaties and do these treaties secure the State?	3,6	3,4	3,4	↔
Q4. Are there any corresponding policies in Moldova to ensure the protection of the environment?	3,7	3,4	3,4	↔
Q5. The policies to hinder human trafficking, and fighting against organized crime successfully are implemented?	3,7	3,5	3,25	↑
Q6. In your opinion are the measures and steps taken to fight organized crime are efficient?	4	3,6	2,75	↑
Q7. Do you think that it will be possible to settle the Transnistrian conflict by the end of 2005?	3,88	4,22	4,2	↑
Q8. What do you think, is Moldova a part of the security and defense Euro-Atlantic sector of the NATO Alliance?	1,56	1,33	1,2	↑